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The “Fetal Protection” Wars: Why America Has Made the Wrong Choice
in Addressing Maternal Substance Abuse - A Comparative Legal Analysis

INTRODUCTION
On December 21, 2007 Theresa Hernandez was sentenced in Oklahoma City to
fifteen years in prison for second degree murder, based on her delivery of a stillborn child
and her admission that she took methamphetamine while pregnant. There is no reliable
evidence linking stillbirths to methamphetamine use, 1 but Hernandez is only the latest of
scores of American women targeted in a national crusade against “fetal abuse,” who have
been prosecuted, and sentenced to lengthy prison terms based on their use of legal and
illegal drugs while pregnant. 2 This crusade began in the late 1980s, with the prosecution of

1

Ms. Hernandez was initially charged with first degree murder and faced a life sentence. After having
being held in county jail awaiting trial for three years without being able to have her children visit her, she
entered a guilty plea to second degree murder. Dana Stone, Is Meth Murder Charge Useful?, The
Oklahoman (Oklahoma City, OK), Dec, 19, 2007.
2
The first reported effort at prosecution was in 1989 in Winnebago County, Illinois, for involuntary
manslaughter, but the grand jury refused to indict. Marcella S. Kreiter, Cocaine Mothers and Cocaine
Babies, UPI May 27, 1989, BC cycle. Since then, at least 25 states have prosecuted women for murder,
manslaughter, child abuse or endangerment, or drug delivery to a minor. Lynn Paltrow, Punishing
Pregnant Women for Their Behavior During Pregnancy, at www.crlp.org/pub_bp_punwom_page3.html.
The following cases are those for which either a published decision, other court document, or newspaper
article is available. State v. Reinesto, 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Reyes v. Superior Court, 141
Cal. Rptr. 912, (1977), Jaurigue v. People, No. 18988, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 1992); People v.
Stewart, No. M508197, Transcript of Hearing (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987); State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d
338 (Fla. 1997); Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla.
App. 1991); State v. Carter, No. 89-6274, slip op. (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1990), aff'd, 602 So. 2d 995, 996
(Fla. App. 1992); Hillman v. State, 503 S.E. 2d 610 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998), State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32
(Ga. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Aiwohi, 123 P. 3d 1210 (Haw. 2005); People v. Bedenkop, 252 Ill. App. 3d
419, 192 Ill. Dec. 163, 652 N.E.2d (1st Dist. 1993); State v. Barnett, No. 02D04-9308-CF-611, Order (Ind.
Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 1994); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993); Kilmon v. State, 905
A.2d 306 (Md. Ct. App. 2006); Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15,
1990); People v. Hardy, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991), People v. Bremer, No. 137619 (Mich. Ct. App.
July 14, 1992), People v. Cox, No. 90-53454 FH, slip op. (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 9, 1990), aff'd, No. 131999
(Mich. App. Feb. 28, 1992); State v. Lewis, Case 03CR113048, Chariton County, Missouri Circuit Ct.;
State v. Arandus, No. 93072, slip op. (Neb. Dist. Ct. June 17, 1993); New Jersey v. Barker, No. 96-02-605,
Tr. of hearing at 30-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 1997); People v. Morabito, slip op. (N.Y. Ont. Cty. Ct. Sept.
24, 1992), aff'g, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Geneva City Ct. Jan. 28, 1992), People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843
(Geneva City Ct. Jan. 28, 1992), aff'd, slip op. (N.Y. Ont. Cty. Ct. Sept. 24, 1992); Sheriff, Washoe
County, Nevada v. Encoe, 110 Nev. 1317, 885 P.2d 596 (Nev. 1994); State v. Inzar, Nos. 90CRS6960,
90CRS6961, slip op. (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 1991), No. 9116SC778 (N.C. App. Aug. 30, 1991); State v.
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women who used cocaine while pregnant for crimes like child endangerment and delivery of
drug to a minor, but in the last several years this crusade has become a veritable holy war,
accelerating in intensity and scope. Since 1999, more than thirty American women have
been indicted for using alcohol or other drugs while pregnant, charged with crimes ranging
from child abuse to first degree murder, and have received prison sentences of up to twenty
years.
The American “fetal protection” movement is unique among developed and
developing nations. While other nations also have populations of poor women whose lives
are highly dysfunctional or who are addicted to alcohol and other drugs, only in the United
States are these women treated as criminals or civilly committed based on their conduct
while pregnant. Only in the United States do prosecutors take the position that embryos and
fetuses should be protected as full human beings while in utero. At the same time, the
United States stands alone among developed countries in failing to guarantee access to
health care to women and children throughout their lives and in failing to provide other
economic, legal, and social supports (including treatment for drug and alcohol addiction) in
order to increase the chances that women can nurture and provide for their children, as well
as reduce the incidence of women’s addiction.

Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992), State v. Andrews, No. JU 68459, slip op. (Ohio C.P. June 19, 1989);
State v. Alexander, No. CF-92-2047, Transcript of Decision (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 31, 1992);
Commonwealth v. Kemp, No. 114-Pitt-1993, Judgment, slip op. (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 1994), aff'g, 75
Westmoreland L.J. 5, slip op. (Pa. Ct. C.P. Dec. 16, 1992), Commonwealth v. Kemp, 75 Westmoreland L.J.
5, slip op. (Pa. Ct. C.P. Dec. 16, 1992), aff'd 643 A.2d 705 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); State v. Eagle Hawk, 411
N.W.2d 120 (S.D. 1987); Ward v. State, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2371 (Tex Ct. App. March 29, 2006),
Collins v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Commonwealth v. Wilcox, No. A-44116-01, slip
op. (Va. Dist. Ct. Oct. 9, 1991). Commonwealth v. Smith, No. CR-91-05-4381, slip op. (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept.
16, 1991), Commonwealth v. Turner, No. 91-054382, slip op. (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 16, 1991); State v. Dunn,
916 P.2d 952 (Wash. App. 1996); State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490 (Wis. App. 1999); Judge Drops
‘Meth Baby’ Charge, Casper (Wyoming) Star-Tribune, Sept. 29, 2005, State v. State v. Osmus, 276 P.2d
469 (Wy. 1954). South Carolina is the only state in which convictions of pregnant drug users have been
upheld. Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997) (upholding child abuse conviction under
child endangerment statute for prenatal drug use); State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003).
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What is noteworthy about the women targeted by “fetal protection” warriors are the
many ways in which the women are already marginalized. In addition to their to alcohol or
drug addiction, the overwhelming majority of these women have histories of mental illness
and/or mental retardation, and there is significant evidence that much of their drug use is an
attempt to self-medicate for depression or other illnesses. 3 These women are
disproportionately women of color and almost always living in poverty. 4 In many cases, they
are victims of childhood sexual abuse and current domestic violence. 5
In this paper I will pursue four lines of inquiry. First, I will briefly chronicle the
history of criminal prosecution of pregnant women in America and show how these
prosecutions have become markedly more aggressive over the last twenty years. Second, I
will situate these prosecutions in the full context of American law, demonstrating how the
fetus has increasingly been given legal recognition in a wide variety of circumstances. I will
argue here that “fetal protection” prosecutions are part of a broader attack on women’s
rights, including not only the right to reproductive freedom but also the right to control
other aspects of their economic and private lives.

I will contrast the fetal protection

movement’s focus on denying abortion access, creating crimes for fetal harm, and protecting
embryonic and fetal life in other ways, with the failure of American government to provide

3

See Women’s Law Project, Responding to the Needs of Pregnant and Parenting Women with Substance
Use Disorders in Philadelphia 4, 6 (Sept. 2002); see also Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnancy, Domestic Violence,
and the Law: The Interface of Medicine, Public Health, and the Law: Governmental Responses to
Pregnant Women Who Use Alcohol or Other Drugs, 8 DePaul J. Health Care L. 461, 477 (2005)
(hereinafter Pregnancy, Domestic Violence, and the Law).
4
Dorothy E. Roberts, Killing the Black Body OR Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 938,
939 (1997), Laura Gomez, Misconceiving Motherhood: Legislators, Prosecutors and the Politics of Prenatal
Drug Exposure 118 (1997).
5
Id. See also Women’s Law Project, supra, and Lynn R. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, supra. It is
notable that domestic violence rises in connection with pregnancy. Homicide accounts for more than 11%
of all deaths of pregnant women. Antonia Zerbisias, Killings Reopen Debate on Rights of Fetuses, Toronto
Star, Oct. 10, 2007. Homicide is the second most common cause of death for pregnant women, following
only behind auto accidents, but ahead of the death rate for any single pregnancy-related condition. Id.,
Lynn Moriarty, Valley Voice: Pregnant Women Face Increased Violence, Desert Sun (Palm Springs, CA),
June 28, 2007, at 6B.

5

adequate health care for women and children. Third, I will examine the laws of two other
nations, Canada and France, for purposes of comparative legal, cultural, and economic
analysis. I will offer some informed speculation about the reasons why the American
obsession with “fetal protection” is not matched by other nations. Here I will address four
factors: America’s considerable reliance on constitutional litigation as a means of achieving
law change, America’s federal system of government, which provides more opportunities for
different legal rules to operate concurrently within the same nation, the United States’ unique
system of locally elected prosecutors, and the lack of a system of government-funded
universal health care. Finally, I will suggest ways in which American law could be reformed
to embrace the unity of interests of pregnant women and their fetuses and promote the
health of both, by providing treatment, not punishment, for addicted women.

I.

Two Decades of Prosecuting Pregnant American Women
A. The Risks of Maternal Drug Use
A focus on maternal behavior as the guarantor of successful childrearing is not new.

Ever since Jean Jacques Roseau penned Emile, mothers have been seen as essential to
creating healthy citizens and ensuring social harmony. 6 In the 1950s, American women were
supposed to be at home full time to nurture their children. Since the late 1980s, American
prosecutors, physicians, public health officials, and media have focused on the potential for
children to be harmed by their mother’s drug use (including alcohol, caffeine, tobacco, and
6

In Emile, Jean Jacques Rousseau urged French women to take up their duties to breastfeed their infants.
He wrote: “Do you want to bring everyone back to his first duties? Begin with mothers. …The whole
moral order degenerates; naturalness is extinguished in all hearts [when wet nurses, and not their mothers,
nourish infants]….Let women once again become mothers, men will soon become husbands and fathers
again.” Emile (or On Education), trans, A. Bloom (1979)), cited by Rebecca Kukla, Mass Hysteria:
Medicine, Culture, and Mothers’ Bodies 30-35 (2005) (arguing that Rousseau’s vision of “the maternal
body” played a central role in Enlightenment thinking, and still influences modern views of the role of
mother in society).

6

other drugs) while pregnant. Approximately 5-6% of American women use illegal drugs
during pregnancy, while 25% use alcohol. 7 Drug use is common across all ethnic groups
and classes; although black women are ten times more likely to have their drug use reported
to prosecutors or child welfare authorities. 8 Most scientists agree that drug use, broadly
defined, during pregnancy can harm the newborn, but they disagree about both the severity
and the permanence of the harm. 9
The dangers of in utero alcohol exposure are well demonstrated, although it was not
until the 1970s that the causal relationship between maternal alcohol use, fetal harm, and
mental retardation became clear. 10

Even infants born to mothers who drink moderately

while pregnant may experience deficits in IQ, learning, and attention, 11 but the debate
continues about whether minimal alcohol consumption during pregnancy is dangerous.
It is less clear whether, and to what extent, other drugs affect fetal development.
Some researchers have determined that maternal cocaine use may lead to subtle, long-lasting
neurological deficits, including “the ability to habituate or self-regulate” and small deficits in
IQ and language ability, 12 but others have found that most infants exposed in utero to
cocaine “catch up to their peers in physical size and health status by age 2.” 13

7

Addiction Medicine: Psychopathology of Pregnant Women with Alcohol and Drug Dependencies
Examined, Women’s Health Weekly, Aug. 23, 2001, at 8 (hereinafter Addiction Medicine).
8
Ira Chasnoff, The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in
Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1206 (1990) (observing
that black women were ten times as likely as white women to be reported by their physicians for using
drugs, despite equal rates of drug use).
9
See, e.g., National Conference of State Legislatures, States Responses to Maternal Drug and Alcohol Use:
An Update (2000), available at www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/maternalabuse.htm, and Janet R.
Hankin, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Prevention Research, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism’s Alcohol Research and Health (August 2002).
10
Addiction Medicine, supra n. [7].
11
Steven J. Onderama, Sharon M. Simpson, Elizabeth V. Brestan, Martin Ward, Prenatal Drug Exposure
and Social Policy: The Search for an Appropriate Response, 5 (No. 2) Child Maltreatment 93, 95-97
(2000) (hereinafter Prenatal Drug Exposure).Prenatal Drug Exposure supra, at 95-97.
12
Id.
13
National Conference of State Legislatures, States Responses to Maternal Drug and Alcohol Use: An
Update (2000), supra n. [ 9 ].
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Methamphetamine is the illegal drug de jour, which is affecting communities across
the United States. It is portrayed by law enforcement and the media as posing a risk of
serious fetal harm; however, there is scant data demonstrating a causal relationship between
exposure to methamphetamine in utero and problems of infant development. 14
Even legal drugs are now coming under heightened public scrutiny. Tobacco use
during pregnancy poses risks similar in kind to those of cocaine, although the risks are of
lower magnitude. Of course, many more women smoke while pregnant than use cocaine. 15
Caffeine, a widely used drug, has recently received substantial media attention, although the
evidence of its harmful effects is quite limited and sharply contested. 16
Recent research stresses the multiple determinants of poor birth outcomes, with
important factors including maternal poverty, poor nutrition, homelessness, a history of
domestic violence, and lack of prenatal care. 17 Because it is difficult to untangle the complex
14

See, e.g., Dana Stone, supra n. 1. Media stories abound concerning the risks of in utero methamphetamine exposure for the long-term development of children. See, e.g., Katie Zernike, A Drug Scourge
Creates its Own Form of Orphan, N.Y. Times July 11, 2005, at A1; U.S. Warns of ‘Global Meth Threat,’
available at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news/bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/475719.s
(5/14/2006). Others have criticized this media coverage as sensational and poorly informed. See, e.g.,
Daniel Thigpen, Case of Lodi Baby Raises Difficult Legal Dilemma, The Record (Stockton, CA), Oct. 14,
2007 (discussing a lack of medical data showing that methamphetamine causes developmental problems in
children), and Meth and Myth: Top Doctors, Scientists and Specialist Warn Mass Media on “Meth Baby”
Stories, available at http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/397/methandmyth.shtml (July 29, 2005); see also
Ryan S. King, The Next Big Thing? Methamphetamine in the United States 16-28 (The Sentencing Project
June 2006) (asserting that the media have failed utterly to accurately report the science and epidemiological
data surrounding methamphetamine addiction), and Canadian Broadcasting System (CBC) News, Newborn
Hair Signals Expectant Mothers’ Meth Use: Study, CBC News, Oct. 31, 2006 (noting the difficulty in
determining whether a newborn’s low birthweight should be attributed to its mother’s use of stimulants like
methamphetamine and cocaine while pregnant or due to her poor nutrition and lack of “self-care” because
of drug use.
15
N. Kistin, A. Handler, F. Davis, and C. Ferre, Cocaine and Cigarettes: a Comparison of Risks, 10 (3)
Paediatric Perinatal Epidemiology 269 (1996) (noting that while children exposed to cocaine in utero were
more likely to have adverse birth outcomes than children whose pregnant mothers consumed no drugs,
children whose mothers used tobacco products while pregnant were at risk for the same adverse outcomes
as children whose mothers used cocaine, although the magnitude of the risk was lower.
16
In January 2008 a report suggesting a link between caffeine intake and miscarriages received wide public
attention, despite the statements of some scientists that the link might not be causal. See, e.g., Denise
Grady, Pregnancy Problems Tied to Caffeine: Long-Held Concerns about Miscarriages Are Focus of New
Study, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 2008, p A10.
17
Because many women who use illegal drugs also abuse alcohol, there is a need for comprehensive and
intensive drug treatment programs that take into account the complex needs of this population, which has
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causal relationships between maternal drug use and other contributors to poor birth
outcomes, it is short-sighted to focus solely on drugs as the source of fetal and childhood
harm.
An intriguing and often overlooked issue is the risk of harm accompanying the use
of assisted reproductive technology (A.R.T.). Twins and other multiple births are far more
likely than “singletons” to be born earlier and smaller, and they are at risk for other
neurological and developmental problems as well. 18 One out of eight American children is
born premature and low-birthweight, with the rate of pre-term births rising 30% since
1981. 19 A large percentage of these children are the product of A.R.T. Few commentators
have suggested that the mothers who use A.R.T. should be criminalized or otherwise
compelled to change their behavior to reduce the possibility of harm to their offspring. 20
Women (and their spouses and partners) who use A.R.T. are permitted complete choice in
terms of the particular technology they use, as well as whether they will have multiple

high “[r]ates of homelessness, poverty, unemployment, and prostitution … [and] histories of emotional,
physical, and sexual abuse.” Addiction Medicine, supra n. [7]. See also Steven J. Onderama, Sharon M.
Simpson, Elizabeth V. Brestan, Martin Ward, Prenatal Drug Exposure, supra, and Deborah A. Frank et al.,
Growth, Development, and Behavior in Early Childhood Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure, 285
JAMA 1613, 1619 (2001).
18
Id., see also Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the
Law Protect Them From Harm?, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 57, 60, 62-66, 69-70, 77-80 (2004) (summarizing data
showing that up to 10% of children born using ART suffer some adverse consequences).
19
Press release, Institute of Medicine, Preterm Birth: Causes, Consequences, and Prevention, July 13, 2006
(hereinafter
IOM
Report
on
Preterm
Birth),
available
at
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=11622. The Report defines
“preterm” as any birth that occurs at less than 37 weeks of pregnancy (a full-term pregnancy is 38-42
weeks post-conception).
20
See, e.g., Tarun Jain, Stacey A, Missmer, and Mark D. Hornstein, Trends in Embryo-Transfer Practice
and in Outcomes of the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States, (noting the adverse
results of the high multiple birth rate in the Unites States, but observing that the United States has not
regulated ART practices “in part because of the basic belief that such decisions should be left to couples
and their physicians”); but see Rosato, supra (criticizing the regulatory hands-off position of states and the
federal government). [add Dorothy Roberts]
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fertilized eggs implanted and/or engage in selective embryo reduction to reduce the chances
of multiple births. 21

B. The First Wave of Criminal Prosecutions
In the last two decades, more than a hundred women in the United States have been
criminally prosecuted for causing harm to their fetuses by using drugs while pregnant. 22 In
the late l980s and early 1990s, as public attention focused on an epidemic of crack cocaine
use (which disproportionately affected racial minorities and the poor) many women were
convicted of crimes such as delivering drugs to a minor or child abuse. In every state but
South Carolina, these convictions were ultimately overturned by state appellate courts. In
invalidating these prosecutions, judges first cited the principle of legality to hold that a fetus
was not a child or that drugs could not be “delivered” to a minor via the umbilical cord, and
emphasized the separation of powers problem inherent in having judges and prosecutors
create law going beyond that enacted by the legislature. 23 Many judges also expressed
concern that criminalizing women’s conduct beyond that already encompassed by the crimes
of drug use or possession would only drive addicted women underground, away from
medical help. 24 Some legislatures, like Missouri’s, concluded that the problem of pregnant

21

Clinics Try to Lower the Odds of Multiple Births, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2008 at F1 and F6. The high
cost of fertility treatment often influences women’s decisions to risk multiple births, and “many people just
see the adorable twins cooing in … double strollers…,” ignoring the 15% of low birthweight infants who
do not survive. Id.
22
See cases noted in n. [ ], supra.
23
In Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997) the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld a
conviction under the child endangerment statute for drug use during pregnancy, declaring that a viable fetus
was a "child" under the statute.
24
See, e.g., Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306 (Md. Ct. App. 2006). Medical and public heath groups also
assert that such prosecutions will simply drive a wedge between pregnant women and their physicians, and
render it less, not more, likely that the women will seek appropriate pre-and post-natal care, including
substance abuse treatment. Accord, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (observing that “an
intrusion on …[a patient’s expectation of privacy in regard to diagnostic medical tests] may have adverse
consequences because it may deter patients from receiving needed medical care.” Id. at 78, n. 14, and 82-

10

women’s drug use could be most effectively addressed by making more drug treatment
resources available, and explicitly precluded the criminal prosecution of women for harm to
their children allegedly caused by prenatal drug exposure. 25

C. The Current Wave of Prosecutions

1. Homicide Prosecutions
However, in the late 1990s, prosecutors in six states began much more aggressive
prosecutions against pregnant women, for the first tune seeking to convict them of acts of
criminal homicide, including murder, manslaughter, and attempted intentional homicide. In
these and other states, prosecutors have also indicted women for crimes such as child abuse
and drug delivery, even though these prosecutions had been declared to be legally unsound
previously, either in those states or in other jurisdictions. In many recent cases, prosecutors
have been assisted by nurses and doctors.
In 1996, Wisconsin prosecutors charged a young woman, Deborah J.Z., with
attempted first-degree intentional homicide 26 and first-degree reckless injury, 27 based on her
comments, made following going into labor at a bar, that she would drink herself and her
fetus to death. 28 The Wisconsin Supreme Court condemned the woman’s behavior but

85). In a separate article, I will explore at greater length the anti-deterrent impact of criminal prosecutions
on women seeking prenatal care and substance abuse treatment.
25
State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d. 663, at 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007), discussing, inter alia, Mo. Rev. Stat. §
1.205, which provides, simultaneously that “human life begins at conception” and that “[n]othing in this
section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of action against a woman for indirectly harming her unborn
child by failing to properly care for herself or by failing to follow any particular program of prenatal care.”
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.205 (1) and (4), respectively.
26
At the time, Wisc Stat. 940.01, first-degree intentional homicide, provided that: “(a) … whoever causes
the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class A felony.”
(emphasis added).
27
At the time, Wisc. Stat. § 940.23, “Reckless injury,” provided that: “(a) Whoever recklessly causes
great bodily harm to another human being under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life
is guilty of a Class D felony.”
28
Deborah J.Z. “’allegedly told a nurse that ‘if you don’t keep me here, I’m just going to go home and keep
drinking and drink myself to death and I’m going to kill this thing because I don’t want it anyways.’”
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barred the criminal prosecution. Relying on the principle of legality, the court ruled that
under Wisconsin’s “born alive” rule, a fetus was not a human being, 29 and thus the
attempted homicide statute did not apply. The court identified several problems with the
prosecution. The court first asked whether the problem of substance abuse was better
addressed through treatment or punishment, noting the concern that threatening criminal
prosecution could deter women from seeking prenatal care or treatment for substance
abuse. 30 In addition, the court recognized the significant slippery slope problem created by
the prosecution of pregnant women: since there is an extended continuum of maternal
behavior which potentially risks harm to the fetus, where on that continuum should the line
justifying criminal prosecution be drawn? The court observed that to permit the prosecution
to go forward in this case would mean that “a woman could risk criminal charges for any
perceived self-destructive behavior during her pregnancy that may result in injuries to her
unborn child [, including] smoking or abusing legal medications…. [or] ‘the failure to secure
adequate prenatal medical care and overzealous behavior, such as excessive exercising or
dieting.’” 31
In South Carolina, by contrast, prosecutors have engaged in an ever more strident
campaign against pregnant women, with conviction and harsh sentences imposed in many

Deborah J.Z. also expressed fear about the pain of giving birth and the baby’s race. State v. Deborah J.Z.,
596 N.W.2d 490, 491(Wis. 1999). The child was born with a blood alcohol level of .199 and physical
features showing fetal alcohol effects. Id.
29
Id. at 496. Wisconsin law defined a “human being” as “one who has been born alive.” Wisc. Stat. s.
939.22 (16). The court explained its decision as required by the rule of strict construction of penal laws and
by deference to the legislature in a complex public policy area. Id. at 494-95.
30
596 N.W.2d at 495. The court’s concern is supported by a study of low-income women who delivered
their babies at an inner city hospital in Detroit. The women stated their belief that if Michigan adopted a
law mandating that women whose babies tested positive for drugs would be sent to jail, substance-abusing
women would be less likely to seek prenatal care, drug testing, or drug treatment. When the study’s
authors attempted to interview women in a state with a law that threatened incarceration, all known drug
users refused to participate in the study out of fear of self-incrimination. Marilyn L. Poland, Mitchell P.
Drombrowski, Joel W. Ager, and Robert J. Sokol, Punishing Pregnant Drug Users: Enhancing the Flight
from Care, 31 Drug and Alcohol Dependence 199, 201-02 (1993).
31
Id., citing Hillman v. Georgia, 503 S.E.2d 610, 613 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
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cases. During the 1990s, nurses at Charleston’s main public hospital joined with prosecutors
to create a clandestine program to test the infants born to women suspected of drug use.
The United States Supreme Court struck down the program as violating the women’s Fourth
Amendment rights in Ferguson v. City of Charleston. 32
In 1999, Regina McKnight became the first American woman to be charged with
murder 33 after her child was stillborn. McKnight was a homeless African-American woman
with an IQ of 72 who was addicted to crack cocaine. 34 After she went into premature labor,
her child was stillborn.

McKnight and her child were tested for drugs and cocaine

metabolites were found in both their systems. 35 Although her first trial ended in a mistrial
largely because of the weakness of the prosecution’s case on causation, in the second trial
McKnight was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in prison. 36 The South Carolina
Supreme Court upheld the conviction, rejecting defendant’s argument that a homicide
prosecution violated the due process principle of legality. The court failed to address the
essence of her contention - that her actions could not constitute homicide without an
express legislative declaration that a fetus could be considered a child for purposes of the
penal law. Instead, the court cited its prior decisions upholding women’s convictions for
felony child abuse based on their drug use while pregnant, saying that these decisions
provided ample notice to meet due process concerns. 37 The court also rejected McKnight’s
32

532 U.S. 67 (2001) (rejecting an asserted “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment).
State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003). The actual charge against McKnight was “homicide by
child abuse,” a statutory enactment of the felony-murder rule. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-85 provides that this
offense is committed if one “causes the death of a child under the age of eleven while committing child
abuse or neglect, and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human
life.”
34
Robyn E. Blummer, Moralists’ New Target: Pregnant Women, St. Petersburg (Florida) Times, Aug. 10,
2003, p. 7D.
35
State v. McKnight, 576 S.E. 2d 168 171, 173.
36
The court suspended the sentence upon service of twelve years in prison. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d
168, 171 (S.C. 2003).
37
Id. at 175-76, citing Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997). The court also rejected Ms.
McKnight’s argument McKnight’s arguments that the evidence was insufficient to establish either
33
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constitutional arguments based on her right to privacy and her Eighth Amendment
proportionality argument. 38
Prosecutors have also brought homicide charges in Hawaii, Missouri, Oklahoma, and
Utah. In 2003 a Hawaii prosecutor charged Tayshea Aiwohi with manslaughter based on her
methamphetamine use while pregnant, which allegedly caused the death of her infant two
days after birth. 39 The indictment was not brought for two years, after Ms. Aiwohi had
successfully completed a drug treatment program.

The prosecutor and the trial judge

asserted that criminal charges were necessary to hold her accountable and to send a message
to prevent other mothers from using drugs while pregnant. 40 After conviction, Ms. Aiwohi
received a twenty year prison sentence, which was suspended on condition that she comply

causation or the necessary mens rea of “extreme indifference to the value of human life. It found that the
mens rea was met by its precedents upholding felony child abuse convictions for maternal drug use while
pregnant, declaring that both she and other women in South Carolina were thus on notice that the use of
cocaine while pregnant causes fetal harm. The court also found sufficient evidence to send the case to the
jury on the causation question, despite evidence that in approximately 40% of stillbirths it is impossible to
make a medical judgment about the cause of death. Id. at 172-73.
38
McKnight asserted that a twenty year prison term for the stillbirth of a child was disproportionate, given
that the maximum sentence for a woman who procures an abortion in South Carolina is two years and the
crime is a misdemeanor. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-41-80 (b) (2002). The court compared McKnight’s sentence
to the sentence received by other convicted murderers in South Carolina, and murderers of children in other
states. Id. at 177. The court declined to consider the applicability of the abortion statute was applicable,
saying that she had not preserved the issue for appellate review. Id. at 174.
39
Decision in State v. Aiwohi, by Circuit Judge Michael Town, Aug. 25, 2004, available at
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/page_server/LegalReferences/73DFB8859867A628EAE7AB3DC5.html.
40
Id., denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, According to the prosecutor, the indictment was a
necessary “’wake-up call,’” so that “’we will never see a case like this again.’” Ken Kobayashi, Mother
Gets Probation in Ice Death, Honolulu Advertiser, Aug. 26, 2004, p.1B. The trial judge concurred, ruling
that “the State, with good reason, has served clear notice that such conduct can and will result in serious
felony charges brought where the child is born alive and later dies or suffers injury due to knowing,
intentional or reckless drug use.” The judge rejected any suggestion that Aiwohi’s addiction could be a
mitigating factor, declaring that, [D]rug usage, including the use of crystal methamphetamine is a matter of
choice and not an illness. Certainly it is a conscious choice to obtain and use the drug initially and worse
yet, while pregnant.” Opinion available at http://www.courts.state.hi.us/page_server/ LegalReferences/
73DFB8859867A628EAE7AB3DC.html.
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with the terms of probation for the next ten years. 41 On appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court
overturned the conviction on legality grounds. 42
Yet even after the convictions of McKnight and Aiwohi, many observers were stunned
by the 2004 decision of Utah prosecutors to charge Melissa Rowland for capital murder
based on her decision to decline a recommended caesarian section (C-section) and the
stillbirth of her son. Like Ms. McKnight, Ms. Rowland was a vulnerable woman without an
adequate support system. Her own mother died soon after she was born, and Ms. Rowland
had a long history of serious mental illness and substance abuse. 43 When she became
pregnant with twins, she decided to give up the infants for adoption. She moved to Utah
when the adoption agency told her that Utah’s less demanding adoption laws made the
process easier. While awaiting delivery, Ms. Rowland lived on disability payments and a $100
weekly stipend from the adoption agency and used cocaine and tobacco. 44 When she could
not feel fetal movements Ms. Rowland sought help at three hospitals, but she rejected the
hospitals’ advice to have a C-section. 45 After Ms. Rowland delivered a stillborn son and a
living daughter, she was charged with murder. Prosecutors predicated their case on a theory
of maternal “selfishness,” asserting that Rowland’s decision not to have a C-section
demonstrated the “depraved indifference to human life” necessary for murder. 46

41

The

Id.
The Court held, in a rather technical opinion, that the attendant circumstance that the victim be a person at
the time of the defendant’s conduct was an essential element of manslaughter, and thus her conviction
could not stand State v. Aiwohi, 109 Haw. 115, 128, 123 P. 3d 1210, 1223 (Haw. 2005).
43
Linda Thomson and Pat Reavy, Rowland’s Out of Jail, Heading to Indiana, Deseret Morning News (Salt
Lake City, Utah), Apr. 30, 2004.
44
Katha Pollitt, Pregnant and Dangerous….,” 278 (#16) The Nation 9 (Apr. 26, 2004).
45
Prosecutors charged that she refused to have a Caesarian section because of “cosmetic concerns” that the
operation would disfigure her, but Rowland stated that she never would have said that because she had
already delivered two children by C-section. Linda Thomson and Pat Reavy, supra n. [42]; see also
Pamela Manson, Mother is Charged in Stillborn Son’s Death..., Salt Lake Tribune Mar. 12, 2004.
46
Linda Thomson, Rowland Case Is Called ‘Political,’ Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City, Utah)
March 13, 2004.
42
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prosecutors argued that Ms. Rowland had refused the surgery because of vanity, 47 and
alleged, contrary to well-established principles of informed consent, 48 that Ms. Rowland did
not have a right to decline medical treatment. 49 After three months in jail, Rowland entered
into a plea agreement by which she pleaded guilty to two counts of felony child
endangerment. 50
Since the Rowland prosecution, at least five other women have been charged with
homicide based on their drug use while pregnant when the child died or was stillborn.
These include Jennifer Arrowood, 51 Jamie Lee Burroughs, 52 and Lorraine Patrick 53 in South
Carolina, Theresa Hernandez in Oklahoma, 54 and Sheri Lohnstein in Missouri. 55

47

Associated Press, Caesarean Refusal Leads to Murder Charge,
http: //www.CNN.com/2004/US/West/03/11/mother.charged.ap. (Mar 12, 2004).
48
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5 codifies the common law of informed consent, although it presumes that
“when a person submits to health care rendered by a health care provider … that what the health care
provider did was expressly or impliedly authorized” by the patient. § 78-14-5(1). However, patients may
still have a cause of action for battery without meeting the requirements of § 78-14-5 if they allege that they
did not consent at all to medical treatment. Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
49
Linda Thomson, Mother Is Charged in Stillbirth of a Twin, Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City,
Utah) March 12, 2004.
50
Ms. Rowland was sentenced to two concurrent five year prison terms, with sentence suspended while on
“good behavior” probation for eighteen months, requiring her to complete mental health and substance
abuse treatment as well as a “parenting skills” course. Jacob Santini, supra, Doug Smith and Linda
Thomson, Rowland in New Trouble, Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City, Utah) May 27, 2004.
51
In 2005 Ms. Arrowood was charged with homicide by child abuse. In 2006 she pleaded guilty to
unlawful neglect by a custodian and was sentenced to ten years in prison. This information was obtained
through a national judicial website, available at: http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/caseSearch/caseSearch.cfm
Ms.
Arrowood’s
information
was
found
at
http://www.13th-judicialcircuit.org/Central_Index_Details_Crim.asp?tb_Casenum=I675718&tb_CourtAgency=39001&tb_LastNam
e=Arrowood&tb_FirstName=Jennifer&tb_SeqNum=0&tb_County=39&tb_CourtType=G
52
In 2006 Ms. Burroughs was charged with homicide by child abuse. The case is still pending. Kelly
Marshall Fuller, Test for Drugs Sends Woman Back to Jail, The Sun News (Myrtle Beach, S.C.) Apr. 24,
2007.
See
information
available
at:
http://secure.georgetowncountysc.org/publicindex/PICaseDetails.aspx?County=22+&Casenum=H750929&
CourtType=G&CaseType=Criminal&CourtAgency=22001&LastName=Burroughs&FirstName=Jamie
53
Ms. Patrick was charged in October 2007 with homicide by child abuse. Her case is still pending. See
information
available
at:
http://www.lexco.com/applications/scjdweb/publicindex/PICaseDetails.aspx?County=32+&Casenum=J820080&CourtTy
pe=G&CaseType=Criminal&CourtAgency=32001&LastName=Patrick&FirstName=Lorraine.
54
See sources cited in note 1, supra.
55
Tim Bryant, Mother Can’t Be Prosecuted in Baby’s Death, Lawyer Argues, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct.
16, 2007, p. B1; Kelly Wiese, Missouri Lawmakers Offer Bills on Courts, Taxes, Alcohol for ’08, Kansas
City (MO) Daily Record, Dec. 4, 2007.
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2. New Child Abuse and Child Endangerment Prosecutions
While prosecutors in some states were pursuing homicide charges, prosecutors in
other states, notably Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Texas, and
Wyoming, were bringing child abuse and child endangerment charges against women who
used drugs while pregnant, invoking legal theories discredited more than a decade earlier.
In all cases, the charges were dismissed or the convictions were overturned. In 2003,
a Missouri prosecutor charged Keila Lewis with first degree felony child endangerment,
based on her newborn baby’s positive test for marijuana and Lewis’ admission that she
smoked marijuana once while pregnant. 56 The case was dismissed because the relevant
toxicology results were ruled inadmissible. 57 In 2005, also in Missouri, Janet Wade was also
prosecuted for felony child endangerment, based on her use of marijuana and
methamphetamine while pregnant. The state Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision to dismiss the charges, holding that while the Missouri legislature recognized that
"[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being," it had
determined to advance those interests in a non-criminal manner. 58 Under this legislative
scheme, pregnant women were to be given first priority in drug treatment programs and
social services were authorized to investigate whether a newborn child was at risk from its
mother’s drug use; at the same time, criminal charges and civil causes of action were
precluded by statute. 59
In 2003, relying on a newly enacted Texas law, a Texas prosecutor brought a series of
indictments, charging eighteen women with child abuse and two others with delivery of a
56

Missouri Brief of Amici Curiae in State v. Lewis, Case 03CR113048, Chariton County, Missouri Circuit
Ct.
57
Personal Communication from Professor Jane Aiken, Washington University School of Law, and Jenean
Thompson, counsel for Keila Lewis.
58
232 S.W.3d 663, 665-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007), citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.205 (2).
59
232 S.W.3d 663, 665-66.
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controlled substance to a minor. 60 The prosecutor asked local physicians to report women
they suspected of drug use, and many complied. 61 In 2006, the Texas Court of Appeals
reversed the convictions of Tracy Ward and Rhonda Smith for drug delivery, holding that
the prosecution had not established the fact of drug delivery beyond a reasonable doubt and
that under the principle of legality, it could not expand the meaning of “deliver” beyond
legislative authorization. 62
In 2004, a Wyoming prosecutor charged Michelle Foust with causing a child to
ingest methamphetamine. A judge dismissed the indictment, ruling that a fetus was not a
child under the law. 63 In 2004 and 2005, a Maryland prosecutor charged two women, Regina
Kilmon and Kelly Cruz, with reckless endangerment based on their use of cocaine while
pregnant. Their convictions were reversed in 2006 by the Maryland Court of Appeals, with
the court concluding that the Maryland legislature had not made this conduct criminal. 64 A
similar result was reached in New Mexico, where in 2003 Cynthia Martinez was convicted of
felony child abuse based on her use of drugs and alcohol while pregnant. In 2006 the New
Mexico Court of Appeals reversed her conviction, holding that the New Mexico legislature

60

The new Texas law, Senate Bill 319, Act of May 31, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 822, 2003 Tex. Gen Laws
2607, redefined the term “individual” in certain statutes to mean “a human being who is alive, including an
unborn child at very stage of gestation from fertilization until birth.” The law also redefined death to
“include… for an individual who is an unborn child, the failure to be born alive.” Tex. Atty. Gen. Opinion
No. GA-0291 (January 5, 2005). The prosecutor charged at least eighteen women with crimes before the
Texas Attorney General issued an Opinion concluding that the new law neither authorized prosecution for
maternal drug use under the Controlled Substances Act nor required physicians to report such drug use.
News from Lynn Paltrow, Executive Director of National Advocates for Pregnant Women,
http://realcostofprisons.org/blog/archives/2005/01/news_from_lynn.html.
61
September 22, 2003 Letter from Rebecca King, 47th District Attorney, available at
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinons/reqiests_ga/RQ0250GA.pdf.
62
Ward v. State, 188 S.W.3d 874, 876 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2006) and Rhonda Tulane Smith v. State,
2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2370 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2006), an unpublished opinion. In Ward the court
declared, “We are a judicial body obligated to enforce the law as written by the legislature. If that body
cares to define “deliver” as including the transfer of drugs by a mother to her unborn child through the
exchange of bodily fluids, it may do so. Yet, ours is not to write where it has not.” Id.
63
Judge Drops ‘Meth Baby’ Charge, Casper (Wyoming) Star-Tribune, Sept. 29, 2005; AP Alert, Woman
Charged with Using Meth While Pregnant Arrested Again, AP May 2, 2005.
64
Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306 (Md. Ct. App. 2006).
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had not intended a “fetus” to be a “child” within the meaning of the child abuse statute. 65 In
2006, Griseliz Fernandez was charged by a New Hampshire prosecutor with reckless
conduct and endangering the welfare of a child after she delivered an infant with traces of
cocaine in its blood. 66 These charges were dropped when Ms. Fernandez pleaded guilty to
other charges and agreed to enter a drug treatment program. 67

3. Summary Observations
What can we conclude about the continuing, intensified prosecution of women for
their drug and alcohol use while pregnant? Although, with the exception of South Carolina,
all of the indictments or convictions have eventually been declared impermissible or
unjustified, prosecutors appear undaunted. What are the reasons for their behavior? It
could be that these prosecutors are motivated simply by career ambitions, and this article will
later consider some characteristics of the American prosecutorial system which may explain
the difference between American prosecutors and their Canadian and French counterparts.
It also appears that some prosecutors are legitimately concerned about in utero drug
exposure, 68 and hope to solve the problem by publicly pillorying the women involved. In
addition, the American federal system provides multiple opportunities for new legal

65

State v. Martinez, 137 P.3d 1195 (N.M. App. 2006). The New Mexico Supreme Court granted
certiorari, 141 P.3d 1280 (2006), and then quashed it, 161 P.3d 260 (2007), making the Court of Appeals
decision final.
66
Fetal Drug Case in Nashua Expected to Set Precedent, The Union Leader (Manchester, N.H.), Aug 1,
2006.
67
Albert McKeon, County Drops Endangerment Case, The Telegraph (Nashua, N.H.), Dec 20, 2006.
68
For example, the Wyoming prosecutor in the Foust case stated, “’We stuck our toe in the water on this
thing….. People need to understand there’s a big hole in the law that needs to be filled.’” Judge Drops
‘Meth Baby’ Charge, Casper (Wyoming) Star-Tribune, Sept. 29, 2005.
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approaches to be tried out in the “laboratory” of the states, 69 where the maxim, “If at first
you don’t success, try, try again” may govern.
However, one need not be a cynic to ask whether prosecutors could be more
effective if they lobbied for comprehensive solutions to address the root causes of much
substance abuse, including domestic violence, mental illness, poverty, and lack of access to
health care. Most physicians and public health authorities agree that threatening drugabusing pregnant women with criminal prosecution, rather than providing them with social
and economic support and effective drug rehabilitation, will drive women away from
treatment, out of fear that they could lose their babies or be imprisoned. 70 New research on
the nature of addiction suggests that, like many other illnesses, substance abuse is caused by
a confluence of genetic, biological, and environmental factors, and can neither be treated nor
made to disappear simply by punishing those who suffer from substance abuse as
criminals. 71
Further, medical authorities, courts, and feminists have asserted that taking a criminal
justice approach to deal with drug-addicted pregnant women launches prosecutors on a
slippery slope. There is simply no principled way to limit prosecution to cases of illegal drug
use. Pregnant women who smoke or who do not follow physicians’ recommendations about
having c-sections, eating properly, or exercising appropriately, could also be prosecuted

69

See the oft-quoted statement of Justice Brandeis in dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, “It is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
70
See, e.g., Martha A. Jessup et al, Extrinsic Barriers to Substance Abuse Treatment Among Pregnant Drug
Dependent Women, 22 J. Drug Issues 285, 291-292, 296-299 (2003); Kirsten Scharnberg, Prosecutors
Targeting Pregnant Drug Users; Some Fear Women Will Shun Treatment, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 23,
2003, at p. C1, Patrik Jonsson, South Carolina Tests the Bounds of a Fetus’s Rights, Christian Science
Monitor, Jun. 28, 2001, at USA Section p. 1. See also Linda Thomson and Pat Reavy, Rowland’s Out of
Jail, Heading to Indiana, supra n.[ ]; Matt Canham, Proposed Law Targets Pregnant Drug Users…, Salt
Lake Tribune (Salt Lake City, Utah), Apr. 10, 2004.
71
See, e.g., Jeneen Interlandi, What Addicts Need, Newsweek, Mar. 3, 2008 (summarizing research).
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under the same theories of maternal harm used in current prosecutions. 72

Finally,

prosecutions of pregnant drug and alcohol abusers raise the ugly spectre of racism seen in
the eugenics movement of the early twentieth century. Not only are almost all women
targeted in the fetal protection crusade poor and/or racial minorities, 73 but the public
reaction favoring such prosecutions is often characterized by undisguised antipathy to the
women.

Public commentary includes eugenic responses remarkably similar to Justice

Holmes’ infamous “three generations of imbeciles is enough” 74 comment in Buck v. Bell. 75

II.

How American Law Promotes the Fetus as a Separate Legal Entity
The criminal prosecutions discussed above are only a small part of the fetal

protection war waged over recent years. 76 Civil suits, statutes, and regulatory initiatives have
all sought to separate fetuses from the pregnant women whose bodies sustain them. In 2002
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued regulations purporting to
“clarify and expand” the definition of “child” contained in the statute authorizing the State

72

Associated Press, Arrest in C-Section Case Alarms Women’s Groups, The Holland [Michigan] Sentinel,
available at http://hollandsentinel.com/stories/031904/new_031904069.shtml.
73
See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Killing the Black Body OR Unshackling Black Motherhood, supra n. 10, at
939, and Ira J. Chasnoff et. al., supra n. , at 1206.
74
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
75
See, e.g., the following blog entries responding to a news story about a South Carolina woman who
pleaded guilty to the crime of unlawful conduct by a legal custodian, and received a sentence of probation
on condition that she agree to use birth control. One blogger wrote, “I think the system should look more
into sterilization of these mothers, then [sic] making them take birth control. WE NEED TO PROTECT
THESE INNOCENT CHILDREN!!!!!” Another observed, “As a nurse who has had to help the children
after being born addicted to drugs or suffering the consequences of poor prenatal care because the breeder
(mother is not appropriate in this case) was too high to notice that she was even pregnant. The suffering at
birth and beyond (due to medical procedures that need to be preformed later in life due to many types of
birth defects associated with drug use and poor prenatal care) is like continuous child abuse. I tend to think
the law is not stiff enough. The taxpayers end up taking care of these children, who are more likely not able
to reach their full potential in life because of the effects of what these women have done to themselves and
the
child
before
it
is
born.”
Blog
comments
available
at
http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/021907/met_117138.shtml#comments.
76
For a fuller account of the broader legal context in which this fetal protection campaign has been waged,
see my article, The New “Fetal Protection”: The Wrong Answer to the Crisis of Inadequate Health Care
for Women and Children, 84 Denver University Law Review 537 (2006).
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Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). 77 These regulations redefined “child,” from
“an individual under 19 years of age” 78 to “an individual under the age of 19 including the
period from conception to birth.” 79 This regulatory legerdemain was criticized as unnecessary,
since Congress was already debating several bills that would permit illegal immigrant women
who were pregnant, the ostensible target of this regulation, to be covered under Medicaid or
SCHIP. 80 It seems clear that the regulation’s real goal was to create a legal precedent for the
principle that the law should treat fetuses as persons, with all rights that accompany that
status. 81

77

SCHIP is a complement to Medicaid, SCHIP was established in 1997 under Title XXI of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-1397jj, and gives states the opportunity to provide additional health
insurance coverage to children whose parents are too “wealthy” to qualify for Medicaid. Medicaid, which
was enacted in 1965 and is authorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 (v) et
seq., provides health care insurance for the very poorest of American children; see also Barry R. Furrow,
Thomas L. Greaney, Sandra H. Johnson, Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, and Robert L. Schwartz, The Law of
Health Care Organization and Finance 418-21 (4th ed. 2001). Both Medicaid and SCHIP are federal/state
partnerships, with the federal and state governments sharing in both the financing and administration of the
two programs. However, there are important differences. Medicaid is an entitlement program, in which all
eligible persons must receive the same benefits. SCHIP gives states greater flexibility in choosing what
services to provide. Barry F. Furrow et al., supra, at 418-21, 438-39. Until 2007, the Bush Administration
routinely approved state requests to expand SCHIP to cover more children at higher income levels
(Remarks of Joe Baker, Assistant to Gov. Eliot Spitzer, at New York City Bar Association Panel on New
York Health Care, Feb. 7, 2008, New York, New York), but the Administration reversed course in the fall
of 2007, and refused to approve New York State’s request to expand its SCHIP program to include children
at 400% of the federal poverty level. Congress and the White House have been at loggerheads ever since.
Donna Smith, U.S. House Sustains Bush Veto of Health Bill, NY Times Jan 23, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/washington/politics-usa-congress-children.html?_r=2&sq....
78
§ 2110 of SCHIP, 42 U.S.C. 1397jj (c) (1).
79
42 C.F.R. § 457.10 (emphasis added).
80
Cynthia Dailard, New SCHIP Prenatal Car Rule Advances Fetal Rights At Low-Income Women’s
Expense, The Guttmacher Report on Public Policy, Dec. 2002, at 3. Among the bills pending were the
Mothers and Newborns Health Insurance Act of 2002, S724 (107th Cong., 1st Sess.), the Start Healthy/Stay
Healthy Act of 2001, S. 1016 (107th Cong., 1st Sess.) and H.R. 3729 (107th Cong., 2nd Sess.), and the
Immigrant Children’s Health Improvement Act of 2001 (S.582) (107th Cong., 1st Sess.) and the Legal
Immigrant Children’s Health Improvement Act of 2001 (H.R. 1143) (107th Cong., 1st Sess.), all of which
proposed to amend Medicaid and SCHIP to permit states to offer health care to more infants and pregnant
women, including immigrant women who were excluded from eligibility under the Personal Responsibility
and work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§601 et seq.
81
See Elisabeth H. Sperow, Redefining Child Under the State Children’s Health Insurance Program:
Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Results, 12 Am. U. J. Gender Soc Pol’y & Law. 137, 143 (2003).

22

Government lawyers have on occasion sought to civilly commit pregnant women, in
order to impose “treatment” on the women and their fetuses, 82 and have also pursued court
orders mandating Caesarian sections. 83 While the avowed goal of these actions is to ensure
the birth of healthy children, most physicians believe that such interventions are
unwarranted and counter-productive. 84 More than thirty states permit civil commitment
based on the use of alcohol and other drugs,85 and several state laws explicitly authorize such
82

These include the case of Angela M.W., State ex re. Angela M.W. v Kruzicki, 561 N.W. 2d 729 (Wis.
1997), and Rebecca Corneau, a woman who belonged to a religious sect that did not practice Western
medicine. Corneau was confined in a “secure hospital facility for pregnant prison inmates” by a
Massachusetts juvenile court judge until she agreed to medical examination and treatment). See Marilyn L.
Miller, Note: Fetal Neglect and State Intervention: Preventing Another Attleboro Cult Baby Death, 8
Cardozo Women’s L. J. 71, 71 (2001).
83
See, e.g., Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr, Inc., 66 F. supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999)
(dismissing women’s § 1983 civil rights action against a hospital which obtained a court order overriding
Ms. Pemberton’s refusal to have a c-section) and News…Husband to Challenge Court Order in Lawsuit
over Wife’s Refusal of Caesarean Section, Penn. Law Weekly Jan. 26, 2004, at 9; New Questions about
Childbirth Rights, AP, May 19, 2004, available at http://keyetv.com/health_story_140110423.html. This
article discussing the case of Amber Marlowe, who was the subject of an ex parte order to have a Caesarian
section because her fetus weighed 11 pounds, despite her having delivered 6 very large children previously.
84
See, e.g., American Medical Association, H-420.969, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, declaring
that “Judicial intervention is inappropriate when a woman has made an informed refusal of a medical
treatment designed to benefit her fetus” and specifically recognizing the need for rehabilitative treatment
for
pregnant
substance
abusers,
available
at
http://www.ama-assn.org/
apps/pf_new/
pf_online?f_n=resultLink&doc=policyfiles/HnE/H-420.969.HTM; American College of Obstetrics and
Gynecology, Patient Choice in the Maternal-Fetal Relationship, in Ethics in Obstetrics and Gynecology
(2d ed. 2004), available at http://www.acog.org/from_home/ publications/ ethics/ethics034.pdf (stating that
“court-ordered intervention against the wishes of a pregnant woman is rarely if ever acceptable”);
American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics, Fetal Therapy – Ethical Considerations (after
discussing the range of medical interventions to promote fetal health and the legal-ethical issues involved,
concluding that “Under no circumstances should a physician physically intervene [to insist on medical
treatment] without the explicit consent of the pregnant woman without judicial review….”), 103 Pediatrics
1061 (5 May 1999).
85
Ala. Code. § 22-52-1.2 (2004), Alaska Stat. § 47.37.1990 (Michie 2004), Ark. Code Ann. § 20-64-815
(Michie 2004), Cal. Wel & Inst Code §3050 (Deering 2005), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-1-1107 (2004), Conn.
Gen. Stat. §17a-685 (2004), Del. Code Ann. Tit. 16, §2212 (2005), D.C. Code Ann. §7-1303.04 (2004),
Fla. Stat. Ch. 397.675 (2004), Ga. Code Ann §37-7-41 (2004), Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §334.60.2 (Michie
2004), Idaho Code §66-329 (Michie 2004), Ind. Code Ann. §12-23-11-1 (Michie 2004), Iowa Code
§125.75 (2003), Kan. Stat. Ann. §59-29b54 (2003), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §28.54 (2004), Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 123 §35 (Law. Co-op, 2005), Miss. Code. Ann. §41-30-27 (2004), Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §71-919
(Michie 2004), N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §135-C:127 (2004), N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-2-8 (2005), N.D. Cent. Code
§ 12.1-04.1-22 (2003), R.I. Gen. Laws § 21-28.2-3 (2004), S.C. Code Ann § 44-52-50 (Law. Co-op. 2004),
South Dakota, Tenn. Code Ann. §33-5-403 (2004), Texas Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.034 (Vernon
2004), Va. Code Ann §37.1-67.1 (Michie 2004), Wash. Rev. Code §70.96A.140 (2004), W. Va. Code Ann.
§ 27-5-2 (Michie 2004), Wis. Stat. § 51.15 (2004), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §25-10-110 (Michie 2004). Minnesota,
Oklahoma, and South Dakota have involuntary commitment laws specifically for pregnant women who use
drugs. Minn. Stat. §626.5561 (2004) Okla. Stat. tit. 43A §5-41- (2004) S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20A70(Michie 2004).
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actions against pregnant women. 86

Most disturbingly, among the thirty-five American

jurisdictions which authorize individuals to execute advance medical directives to govern
their medical care if they become incompetent, two thirds of the jurisdictions suspend these
directives if the patient is pregnant, 87 denying pregnant women the right to selfdetermination and advance planning available to all other adults.
Fetal “guardians” are another recent legal innovation, ostensibly designed to protect
the interests of the “unborn.” In June 2003, the wife of a Florida prosecutor sought to be
appointed guardian of the fetus of a mentally disabled patient who lived in a group home in
order to prevent the woman from having an abortion. 88 Although the Florida courts
ultimately rejected the suit, the case became a cause celebre in Florida. In Alabama, some
trial judges have appointed lawyers to represent the “silent voice” of the fetus in cases in
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See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 48.01, 48.02, 48.067, 48.203, 48.205, permitting the civil commitment of pregnant
girls and women, dubbed “The Cocaine Mom law.” See also Tom Kertscher, ‘Cocaine Mom’ Law Involved
in Attempt to Detain Woman, Racine Case Thought to Be First Time Law is Used Without Other Crime,
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Nov. 5, 1999, p. 1.
87
For an overview of this subject, see Amy Lynn Jerdee, Note, Breaking Through the Silence: Minnesota’s
Pregnancy Presumption and the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 971, 978 (2000)
(hereinafter Minnesota’s Pregnancy Presumption). Seventeen states provide statutory exceptions to their
“living will” or health care proxy statutes which render advance directions automatically ineffective if the
patient is pregnant. Id. at 978, n. 35. Another sixteen states render the living will or health care proxy
inapplicable in a variety of circumstances, ranging from a possibility to a probability that the fetus will
“develop to a live birth.” Id. at n’s 36-44. The Alaska statute cited in n. 37, Alaska Stat. 18.12.040, was
repealed in 2004. Minnesota gives a slight bow to women’s autonomy by establishing a rebuttable
presumption that a pregnant woman would want health care to be provided if there is a “real possibility that
the fetus could survive to the point of life birth,” even if “the withholding or withdrawal of such health care
would be authorized were she not pregnant.” Minn. Stat. § 145C.10 (g). The presumption can be rebutted
by an explicit statement to the contrary in the advance directive itself, or by clear and convincing evidence
presented at a hearing. Id. While this law endeavors to strike a balance between the woman’s interest in
autonomy and the provision of a living maternal body in which the fetus can continue to develop, it still
enshrines a normative view of women – that any “reasonable” woman would choose to continue on lifesupport if it meant that her fetus would survive until birth.
88
This attempt was rejected by the Florida District Court of Appeal in In re: Guardianship of J.D.S., 864
So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), which held that under the Florida guardianship statute, a guardian
can be appointed only for a “person,” and that fetuses were not “persons” under Florida law. Id. at 538.
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which minors seeking an abortion have invoked the judicial bypass procedure to avoid the
requirement of parental consent to abortion. 89
In March 2004, Congress enacted the Unborn Victims of Violence Act (the UVVA
or Act), 90 which made it a crime to injure or cause the death of a fetus while committing
another federal offense. 91 While both supporters and opponents of the Act acknowledged
the significant problem of violence against pregnant women, 92 opponents objected to the
Act’s solution. Rather than focusing on the injury suffered by the pregnant woman herself
and providing that a person who harms a pregnant woman who also injures or kills the fetus
should receive an enhanced penalty for that harm, 93 the UVVA makes this attack or injury a
separate crime. To do so, the UVVA defines “unborn child” broadly, as “a member of the
species homo sapiens, at any stage of development….” 94 Critics of the UVVA and similar state
statutes contend that the law effectively erases the pregnant woman as an injured party. 95 In

89

See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 810 So. 2d. 786, 795 (Ala. 2001) and In re Anonymous, 889 S0.2d 525, 527
(Ala. 2003) (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
90
Pub. L. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004).
91
18 U.S.C. § 1841. The law enumerated a lengthy list of federal offenses, including drive-by shootings in
connection with drug offenses (18 U.S.C. § 36), violence at international airports (18 U.S.C. § 37), and
assault on a federal officer or employee (18 U.S.C. §§ 111), 18 U.S.C. §1841 (b) (1).
92
H. Rep. No. 108-420, Part 1, at 4, n. 2, citing Victoria Frey, Examining Homicide's Contribution to
Pregnancy-Associated Deaths, 285 JAMA 1510 (2001) (summarizing the various studies); Isabelle L.
Horon and Diana Cheng, Enhanced Surveillance for Pregnancy-Associated Mortality--Maryland, 19931998, 285 JAMA 1455 (2001); Linn H. Parsons and Margaret A. Harper, Violent Maternal Deaths in North
Carolina, 94 Obstet. Gynecol. 990-993 (1999); Dannenberg, et al., Homicide and Other Injuries as Causes
of Maternal Death in New York City, 1987 through 1991, 172 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 1557-1564 (1995);
Fildes, et al., Trauma: The Leading Cause of Maternal Mortality, 32 J. Trauma 643-645 (1992).
93
Senator Dianne Feinstein proposed an amendment to the Senate bill to accomplish this, which was
defeated by a vote of 50-49, largely along party lines. A similar amendment offered by Representative Zoe
Lofgren was also defeated in the House of Representatives, by a 229-186 vote. Edward Epstein, Bill to
Make Harming Fetus a Crime is Passed by Senate; Assailant of a Pregnant Woman Could be Charged with
2 Separate Federal Offenses, S. F. Chron. March 26, 2004, at A1, see also H. Rep. No. 108-420, Part 1, at
86.
94
18 U.S.C. § 1841 (d), 10 U.S.C. § 919a (Article 119a) (d) (emphasis added). Under the law, “the term
unborn child means a child in utero, and the term “child in utero” or “child, who is in utero” means a
member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.”
95
See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81 Ind. L. J. 667, 694-97
(2006).
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addition, as with the SCHIP regulation, this language suggests that the statute’s real goal is to
pave the way for sharply limiting access to abortion. 96
Recent proposals for changes in abortion law also emphasize fetal “personhood.” 97
These include laws requiring women seeking abortion to be told about fetal pain, 98 to be
informed of the need to prepare a fetal death certificate, or to be given the opportunity to
view a sonogram or listen to the heartbeat of their fetus prior to deciding to have an
abortion. 99 Supporters of these statutes justify them as providing “informed consent,” but
the statutes are unusual in mandating the substantive details of what patients contemplating
a medical procedure must be told. In contrast, most American informed consent 100 law
focuses on the process of ensuring full communication between patients and their health care
providers rather than the content of the physician-patient dialogue, 101 relying on the health

96

Senator Feinstein argued that the UVVA was a deliberate effort to undermine abortion rights, by
“`set[ting]… the stage for a jurist to rule that a human being an any stage of development deserves …rights
under the law’….,” Edward Epstein, Bill to Make Harming Fetus a Crime is Passed by Senate; Assailant of
a Pregnant Woman Could be Charged with 2 Separate Federal Offenses, supra n. [86].
97
This of course includes the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531, which redefined a
medical procedure to make it more akin to birth, for example, by using such terms as “delivers a living
fetus.” The law was upheld by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
98
See The Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S.51.S1, proposed by Senator Sam Brownback of
Kansas, a fierce abortion opponent, and the Montana Unborn Child Pain Prevention Act, House Bill No.
238.
99
Federal and state funding of fetal imaging machinery has paved the way for these laws through grants
given to organizations that promote “abstinence only” sex education. The so-called “pregnancy crisis
centers” have been a major beneficiary of such grants. Ziba Kashef, The Fetal Position - News: Federal
and State Dollars Are Subsidizing a Boom in Antiabortion 'Crisis Pregnancy Centers,' (Jan./Feb.2003)
(hereafter
The
Fetal
Position,
available
at
http://www.motherjones.com/news/outfront/2003/01/ma_218_01.html; see also The Abortion Access
Project, Impeding the Right to Choose: Crisis Pregnancy Centers, and sources cited therein, available at
www.abortionaccess.org., and the proposed Informed Choice Act, S.755.1S, which provides for additional
funding for ultrasound equipment to be used to provide pregnant women with a visual image of the fetus.
100
Informed consent doctrine has roots in both the common law tort of battery and in negligence. It
protects both a patient’s interest in choosing when to be touched (a battery is an unconsented touching and
includes medical treatment which the patient did not agree to (see, e.g., Schloendorff v. The Society of
New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93-94 (N.Y. 1914) and in receiving medical treatment from a physician
who has explained to the patient those risks and benefits of treatment that a reasonable patient would wish
to know (see, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781-82, 787-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972) and N.Y. Pub.
Health L.
§ 2805-d).
101
Some abortion statutes require that the pregnant woman be told certain details about the fetus, such as its
gestational age and its potential to survive outside the womb, and be informed of the availability of medical
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care professional to determine what information to convey to a particular patient based on
her own individual needs. Revealingly, these so-called informed consent laws are unique in
that their focus is on the interests of a third party, the fetus to be aborted, as opposed to the
patient herself.
Fetal protection doctrine also has a place in American tort law, as every state permits
an infant born alive to sue third parties for harm inflicted prenatally. Only a handful of cases
have considered whether infants should be permitted to sue their mothers for prenatal harm.
The jurisdictions are evenly split on the subject, with three courts holding that women
should not be subject to suit for alleged prenatal negligence, 102 and three holding that such
actions are necessary to compensate the child who has been injured. 103 These cases are
important because they frame the normative question of who is the reasonable pregnant
woman, as well as the related question of who gets to decide what conduct is reasonable.
Similarly, in the American workplace, efforts have been made to protect fetuses from
harm. Unfortunately, rather than ensuring safe conditions for all workers, for whom toxic
exposures or other hazards could jeopardize the health of their future children, these efforts
have focused almost exclusively on female employees. In International Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls the Supreme Court invalidated such workplace “fetal protection” policies, declaring
that they violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because they discriminated on the
assistance for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care, as well as options for child support and adoption,
see, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. § 40:1299.35.6 and Tex. Health & Safety Code §§171.012 – 171.014, 171.016, and
discussion of Pennsylvania’s informed consent requirement in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-877 (1992). In addition, there are other areas of health care in
which state laws mandate that patients (usually women) be told of alternative medical or surgical options.
These include laws addressing hysterectomy, see, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1690; sterilization, see,
e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 436.225; breast cancer, see, e.g., S.G. Nayfield, G.C. Bongiovanni, M.H. Alciati, R.A.
Fisher, L. Bergner, Statutory requirements for disclosure of breast cancer treatment alternatives, 16 J.
Nat’l Cancer Inst. 1202 (1994); and childhood vaccination, see, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-702. Medical
procedures that are less politically charged rarely have such “informed consent” requirements.
102
Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E. 2d 260 (Mass. 2004), Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Ct. App.
1999), and Stallman v. Younger, 531 N.E. 2d 355 (Ill. 1988).
103
National Casualty co. v. Northern Trust Bank of Florida, N.A., 807 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001),
Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992), and Grodin v. Grodin, 310 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
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basis of gender. 104 However, many employers continue to have such policies, effectively
opting to be sued for gender discrimination rather than facing damage suits for causing
prenatal injury. 105 Almost all fetal protection policies ignore or discount the effects of
exposure to toxic substances on men, despite the scientific evidence that such exposure can
harm the male reproductive system and, thus, the children who are born to exposed men. 106

The Need for Different Priorities to Protect Children
If the government’s goal were actually to ensure that more children are born healthy
and have the opportunity to stay that way, the United States would adopt radically different
policies, offering systemic harm reduction rather than a focusing on a handful of poor,
marginalized, and drug-addicted women. American health care data demonstrate significant
racial disparities in birth outcomes and other measures of children’s health, which reflect a
crisis in access to health care access, including the lack of a primary care physician and the
lack of health insurance. 107

More than ten million American children have no health

insurance at all, 108 and the Bush Administration has recently announced a policy change that
104

International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
Elaine Draper, Reproductive Hazards and Fetal Exclusion Policies after Johnson Controls, 12 Stan. L.
Pol’y Rev. 117, 121 (2001).
106
See, e.g., the EPA’s decision to cancel the pesticide ethylene dibromide (EDB) because of its oncogenic
and mutagenic risks, as well as reproductive risks to male workers, 48 Fed. Reg. 46234 (Oct. 11, 1983), see
also 48 Fed. Reg. 45956 (Department of Labor document regarding EDB’s effects on male reproductive
capacity), cf. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
107
Press release, Institute of Medicine, Preterm Birth: Causes, Consequences, and Prevention, supra;
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Infant Mortality – United States,
1995-2002, 54 (No. 22) Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 553 (June 10, 2005) (noting significant
racial disparities in infant mortality rates within and across states); Kenneth E. Thorpe, Jennifer Flome, and
Peter Joski, The Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage Among Pregnant Women, 1999 (Emory
University April 2001) (identifying disparities in health insurance coverage along racial, employment
status, and income lines) (paper prepared for the March of Dimes, on file with the author).
108
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid Facts, Enrolling Uninsured Low-Income
Children in Medicaid and SCHIP (March 2005) available at www.kff.org/kcmu. In 2005, more than 12%
of children under age 18 lacked health insurance for at least part of the previous year. Robin A. Cohen and
Michael E. Martinez, Centers for Disease Control, Health Insurance Coverage: Estimates from the national
Health Interview Survey, January – September 2005, 3 (Released Mar. 20, 2006). “Uninsured but
Medicaid-eligible children are twice as likely as those enrolled in Medicaid to have an unmet medical need,
105
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will make it very difficult for states to expand access to health care for poor children under
the SCHIP program. 109 One eighth of American infants are born prematurely or are low
birthweight, costing an estimated $26 billion per year, 110 and American infant mortality rates
have risen in recent years. 111
Beyond improving access to quality health care, the government should concentrate
on reducing environmental harms, including the risk to all children posed by such hazards as
mercury in fish, endocrine disrupters, and lead from older buildings and manufacturing.
Many species of fish pose risks to adults, children, and fetuses, primarily through exposure
to mercury and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB). 112 Many widely-used pesticides are
suspected endocrine disrupters, which affect both male and female reproductive systems and
increase the chances of infertility and other reproductive harms. 113 Lead poses risks to male
and female workers, as well as their children. In men, lead exposure leads to lowered sperm
counts, abnormal sperm shapes, altered sperm transfer, and altered hormone levels. The
to have not seen a doctor, and to have substantial family out-of-pocket spending on health care.” Kaiser
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid Facts, Enrolling Uninsured Low-Income Children
in Medicaid and SCHIP, supra.
109
N.Y. Times Jan. 23, 2008.
110
Press release, Institute of Medicine, Preterm Birth: Causes, Consequences, and Prevention, July 13,
2006
(hereinafter
IOM
Report
on
Preterm
Birth),
available
at
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=11622. The Report defines
“preterm” as any birth that occurs at less than 37 weeks of pregnancy (a full-term pregnancy is 38-42
weeks post-conception) and notes that the rate of pre-term births has risen 30 % since 1981.
111
Centers for Disease Control, Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Infant Mortality- United States, 1995-2002, 54
(22) Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (June 10, 2005).
112
Nick Fox, Taking Worry off the Plate, N.Y. Times Jan. 30, 2008, Page F5. “[A] panel convened by the
National Academy of Sciences reported in 2000 that 60,000 children were born each year exposed to levels
of methymercury—the main variety found in fish—that could cause neurological and learning problems.”
Id. “Children born to women exposed to high levels of methylmercury [the organic form of mercury found
naturally in the environment] during or before pregnancy may face numerous health problems, including
brain damage, mental retardation, blindness, and seizures. Lower levels of methylmercury exposure in the
womb have caused subtle but irreversible deficits in learning ability.” Jennifer Fisher Wilson, Balancing
the Risks and Benefits of Fish Consumption, 141 Annals Int. Med. 977, 978 (2004). PCBs are a probable
carcinogen. In addition, “[i]n children, PCB exposure in utero and from breast milk consumption has been
linked with neurodevelopmental delays, impaired cognition, immune problems, and alterations in male
reproductive organs.” Id. at 979.
113
Washington State Department of Labor & Industries Safety & Health Assessment & Research for
Prevention Program, Workplace Hazards to Reproduction and Development: A Resource for Workers,
Employers, Health Care Providers, and Health & Safety Personnel 48-50, Technical Report Number 21-31999 (Aug. 1999).
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results can be sterility and infertility. In women, lead can cause miscarriages, stillbirths, and
infertility, as well as developmental disorders in children exposed in utero. 114
American law also fails to promote fetal and child health through mandated paid
parenting leaves. Although the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 115 requires employers
of more than fifty workers to grant them up to twelve weeks a year of unpaid leave for the
birth or adoption of a child, or for family illness, the law does not adequately respond to
children’s need for parental attention soon after birth and when they are ill. Almost half of
American workers are not covered by FMLA 116 and even among those who are, only a
fraction avail themselves of its leave provisions, because they cannot afford not to work,
thus perpetuating existing race and class disparities. 117

No federal law mandates paid

parental leave for the period connected with pregnancy, childbirth and the early stages of
infancy, 118 and California and Ohio are the only two states to mandate any form of paid
parental leave. 119 In contrast, many other developed nations either mandate or offer paid
parenting leave for at least some portion of this critical stage of fetal and children’s health
114

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, The Effects of Workplace Hazards on Female
Reproductive Health 2-3, available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/99-104.html. Lead that workers bring
home on their skin, hair, clothes, tool box or car can cause severe lead poisoning for everyone who comes
into contact with it, and can result in neurobehavioral and growth effects in a fetus. National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, The Effects of Workplace Hazards on Male Reproductive Health,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ malrepro.html.
115
The Family and Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993), requires employers of more
than fifty employees to permit employees to take an unpaid leave for their own illness or a family
member’s birth, adoption, or illness. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993), codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301,
1302, 1312, 1381-1385, 1401-1416, 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-6387, 29 U.S.C. §§2601, 2611-2619, 2631-2636,
2651-2654.However, in contrast to almost all developed countries, the United States does not mandate paid
leave. Kurt H. Decker, Family and Medical Leave in a Nutshell 9-14 (2000).
116
Erin Gielow, Note: Equality in the Workplace: Why Family Leave Does Not Work, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1529, 1539 (2002) (hereinafter cited as Equality in the Workplace).
117
Nancy E. Dowd, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: Ten Years of Experience: Race, Gender,
and Work/Family Policy, 15 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 219, 222-31 (2004) (hereinafter Ten Years of
Experience).
118
In April, 2006 Representative Caroline Maloney introduced HR 5148, the Federal Employees Paid
Parental Leave Act. The Act would ensure paid leave for 6 of the 12 weeks that federal employees are
authorized to take parental leave.
119
Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 3300 (2006); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.136 (providing that permanent
government employees shall receive 70% of their salary for four of the six weeks in which they are
authorized to take parental leave).

30

and development, 120 and many countries offer additional financial or child-care support to
single parents, those who are most likely to need leave from work to care for a newborn or
ill child and are simultaneously the least likely to be able to afford to do so. 121 In summary,
when compared to other developed nations, the narrow, fetus-centric approach of the
United States is seriously out of step.

III. Other Nations’ Approach to Fetal Protection and Child Health
B. Canada
1. The Legal Framework Regarding Fetuses
Canada has taken a very different approach from that of the United States in regard
to protecting fetuses from harm in utero. To some extent, this difference may result from a
greater reliance on British law, and the maintenance of the born-alive rule, stemming from
the fact that Canada did not gain independence until 1867. 122

However, the path of

Canadian law on fetal protection may also reflect the unifying effects of a strong national
Parliament and the Supreme Court of Canada, as well as the different system for selecting
prosecutors in Canada.
For the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court of Canada has espoused a consistent
view of the relationship between a pregnant woman and her fetus, declaring that the
maternal-fetal relationship is legally unique, as there is but one legal person, rather than two
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Nancy E. Dowd, supra n. [], at 233-36 (summarizing European Union law, and comparing, inter alia,
the approach of France, which mandates maternity leave and provides much more generous paid leaves to
mothers than to fathers, and Sweden, which is gender-neutral in its paid parenting leave policies); see also
Naomi S. Stern, The Challenges of Parental Leave Reforms for French and American Women: A Call for a
Revived Feminist-Social Theory, 28 Vt. L. Rev. 32, 324-25 (2004) (describing the French statutory
scheme), and Erin Gielow, supra n. 113, at 1539.
121
Erin Gielow, supra, at 1547.
122
The Constitution Act [formerly known as the British North America Act], 1867.
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persons with potentially adverse positions. 123 The Court has observed, “[T]he law has always
treated the mother and unborn child as one. To sue a pregnant woman on behalf of her
unborn fetus therefore posits the anomaly of one part of a legal and physical entity suing
itself.” 124 This position was first articulated in the criminal law arena, and has been followed
by decisions in the areas of civil commitment, compelled medical treatment of pregnant
women, and tort law.

a. The Criminal Law
The Canadian Parliament has codified the common law born-alive rule for criminal
matters. 125 In two important decisions, Canadian courts have applied this rule to hold that
neither a pregnant woman nor a third party can be criminally liable for actions contributing
to the injury or death of a fetus. 126 In Regina v. Sullivan and Lemay, 127 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that two midwives who were negligent in their assistance at a home birth could
not be convicted of “criminal negligence causing the death of a person.” 128 The Court
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Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.), [1997] S.C.R. 925 ¶¶ 27-29; Dobson
v. Dobson, [1999] 174 D.L.R. (4th) ¶1 (declaring that, “The relationship between a pregnant woman and
her foetus is unique and innately recognized as one of great and special importance to society”).
124
Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.),[1997] S.C.R. 925 ¶ 27.
125
See discussion of the English genesis of this rule, supra. Under the Canadian Criminal Code § 223:
(1) A child becomes a human being within the meaning of this Act when it has completely
proceeded, in a living state, from the body of its mother, whether or not
(a) it has breathed;
(b) it has an independent circulation; or
(c) the navel string is severed. …
(2) A person commits homicide when he causes injury to a child before or during its birth
as a result of which the child dies after becoming a human being.
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 223.
126
This is very different than the position of most states and the federal government in the United States,
which accept and promote a distinction between actions done to the fetus by a third party and the woman
who carries it. See, e.g,, Cal. Penal Code § 187 (Deering 2008) and the federal Unborn Victims of Violence
Act, Pub. L. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004).
127
[1991] S.C.R. 489, 63 C.C.C. (3) 97.
128
At the time, § 203 of the Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, provided that: “Every one who
by criminal negligence causes death to another person is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to
imprisonment for life.”
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concluded that the foetus 129 was not a person for purposes of the statute since it had died in
the birth canal and thus was not born alive. 130 In its decision the Court relied solely on the
legislative history of the Criminal Code and did not reach the policy issues raised by holding
that a foetus was not a person. 131
In Regina v. Drummond, 132 the Ontario Court of Justice relied on Regina v. Sullivan and
Lemay in forbidding the prosecution of Brenda Drummond, a mentally ill woman who was
pregnant. Ms. Drummond inserted a pellet rifle into her vagina and fired, causing a pellet to
be lodged in the foetus’ brain. The foetus was delivered alive, and subsequently had surgery
to remove the pellet. The prosecutor charged Ms. Drummond with attempted murder, and
defense counsel moved to quash for failing to “disclos[e]… an offense known to law.” 133
The court held that the crime of attempted murder could not be established, because a
foetus was not a child under the Canadian Criminal Code, and therefore, at the time the
mother fired the pellet rifle, she could not form the necessary intent to kill. 134

b. Tort Liability and Civil Commitment
In the late 1990s, the Supreme Court of Canada first confronted the question of
whether a foetus should be considered a legal person in the common law context. In Dobson
v. Dobson, the Court held that the foetus should not be considered a person separate from its
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mother. The Court stated that “The relationship between a pregnant woman and her foetus
is unique and innately recognized as one of great and special importance to society.” 135 In
Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G.(D.F), 136 the Court declared, “Before
birth the mother and unborn child are one in the sense that ‘[t]he “life of the foetus is
intimately connected with, and cannot be regarded in isolation from, the life of the pregnant
woman[.]’” 137 In this case, the Court held that a pregnant woman addicted to solvents could
not be civilly committed in order to receive substance abuse treatment against her will. 138 In
Dobson the Court held that a pregnant woman could not be found liable in tort for alleged
negligence while driving which caused harm to her foetus, even though a third party who
drove negligently could be held liable.
Winnipeg Child & Family Services presented a tragic set of circumstances. Ms. G.D.F.
was a young aboriginal woman 139 who was addicted to solvents (glue) and had already given
birth to three children, two of whom had been injured as a result of their exposure to
solvents in utero. 140

When Ms. G.D.F. became pregnant again she intermittently both

sought and rejected treatment for her addiction. Treatment was not initially available, but
after a slot in a treatment program opened up the local child welfare agency came to Ms.
G.D.F.’s home to take her to a treatment facility. As she was intoxicated at this time she
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refused to enter treatment. 141 The agency sought a court order to detain her for treatment at
the Health Sciences Center. The trial court granted the request, relying on provincial mental
health law and the doctrine of parens patriae to justify its order for civil commitment. 142
On appeal, both the Manitoba Court of Appeal 143 and the Supreme Court of Canada
rejected the trial court’s approach. The Supreme Court began with the premise that “the
[common] law of Canada does not recognize the unborn child as a legal or juridical
person.” 144 After asking whether the rule should be changed in circumstances in which “a
mother is acting in a way which may harm her unborn child,” 145 the Court concluded that it
should not. The Court emphasized that “’[a]scribing personhood to a foetus in law is a
fundamentally normative task. It results in the recognition of rights and duties—a matter
which falls outsider the concerns of scientific classification.’” 146
The Court gave four reasons for declining to hold that a foetus should be considered
a person with rights separate from those of its mother. First, as a matter of separation of
powers, the Court held that the legislature was in a superior position to the courts to weigh
the policy implications of law change. Nonetheless, commenting on those policy concerns,
the Court observed that a decision upholding the civil commitment of pregnant women
might be counterproductive, either because women with substance abuse problems might
not seek prenatal care out of fear of detection and consequent involuntary commitment, or
because drug-addicted women might choose abortion rather than be forced to give up
141
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drugs. 147 Second, viewing its decision on civil commitment as a matter of tort law, the Court
noted that no common law country permitted a child to sue for prenatal injuries unless it
was born alive. Third, and most importantly, the court noted that once a decision was made
to treat the foetus as a person separate from its mother, it would be impossible to find a
principled basis on which to limit tort liability. Fourth, imposing such liability would conflict
with women’s right to autonomy and equality.
Combining these latter two concerns, the Court described the slippery slope onto
which courts would be launched in trying to decide whether a pregnant woman should face
the possibility of tort liability or involuntary civil commitment:
One faces the ‘spectre of mothers being sued by their children for various
activities of lifestyle choices, such as smoking, drinking and the taking or
refusal of medication, during pregnancy that injure the child, with the result
that mothers will be unable to control their own bodies and make autonomous
choices.’ 148
….
….
‘[ A woman’ could …be held liable for any behavior during pregnancy having
potentially adverse effects on her fetus, including failing to eat properly, using
prescription, nonprescription and illegal drugs, smoking, drinking alcohol,
exposing herself to infectious disease or to workplace hazards, engaging in
immoderate exercise or sexual intercourse, residing at high altitudes for
prolonged periods, or using a general anesthetic or drugs to induce rapid labor
during delivery.’ 149
Importantly, the Court also challenged the myth of autonomous choice facing drugaddicted women, and urged that the policy decisions about how best to protect fetuses be
made in the actual context of pregnant substance abusers’ lives. The Court observed:
[L]lifestyle “choices” like alcohol consumption, drug abuse, and poor nutrition
may be the products of circumstance and illness rather than free choice capable
of effective deterrence by the legal sanction of tort. … Treating pregnant
147
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substance abusers as fetal abusers ignores the range of conditions that contribute
to problems like drug addiction and lack of nutrition, such as limited quality
pre-natal care, lack of food for impoverished women, and lack of treatment
for substance abusers. 150
Finally, the Court also considered the question of whether a parens patriae theory
justified the involuntary commitment of pregnant women. The Court concluded that it did
not, 151 holding:
[T]he invasion of liberty involved in making court orders affecting the
unborn child, is of a different order than the invasion of liberty involved
in court orders relating to born children. … The court cannot make decisions
for the unborn child without inevitably making decisions for the mother
herself. The intrusion is therefore far greater than simply limiting the
mother’s choices concerning her child… [and] would seriously intrude on
the rights of women. 152
The Supreme Court used a similar analytical approach in Dobson v. Dobson. 153 The
case raised the question of whether a child who suffered permanent brain injuries due to his
mother’s allegedly negligent driving while pregnant could sue her for this prenatal harm. 154
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions to let the suit go forward, holding
that due to the unique nature of the relationship between a pregnant woman and her foetus
the woman cannot be held liable for allegedly tortious conduct while the foetus was in utero.
Although the Court conceded that children had been permitted to sue third parties for
negligently caused prenatal injuries, it found that these cases were readily distinguishable
from suits for injuries allegedly caused by a pregnant woman’s negligence. The Court
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declared, “There is no other relationship in the realm of human existence which can serve as
a basis for comparison.” 155
In considering whether tort duties should be imposed on pregnant women, the
Dobson court first assumed arguendo that a pregnant woman and her foetus could be treated as
separate entities. It concluded that there would be no limit to the circumstances under
which the woman could be held liable, due to the extraordinarily close physical proximity
between the woman and her foetus, and the enormous range of actions which the woman
could take which could have a detrimental effect on foetal development. 156 The Court noted,
“Everything the pregnant woman eats or drinks, and every physical action she takes, may
affect the foetus.” 157 The Court identified two important public policy concerns “militat[ing]
against the imposition of maternal tort liability for prenatal negligence[:] …the privacy and
autonomy rights of women and … the difficulties inherent in articulating a judicial standard
of conduct for pregnant women.” 158 Addressing women’s interest in autonomy, the Court
emphasized that simply because a woman is pregnant she does not lose “the right to make
person decisions, to control [her]… bodily integrity, and to refuse unwanted medical
treatment.” 159
The Court linked these concerns to the difficulty in developing a workable judicial
standard of conduct for pregnant women, finding that it would be impossible to articulate an
objective standard, since every pregnant woman’s life is different, with women who are welleducated and ignorant, rich and poor, and with and without access to good health care and
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good prenatal care. 160 The Court also observed that any “reasonable pregnant woman”
standard that would develop would inevitably be interpreted in light of the trier of fact’s
prejudices about proper conduct of pregnant women. 161 As in Winnipeg Child & Family
Services, the Court invoked the slippery slope, concluding that there was no principled way to
identify conduct on the part of a pregnant woman that was, or was not, negligent, and
therefore declined to recognize a cause of action in tort. 162 The Court held out the possibility
that Parliament could develop a tailored solution that would address the needs of braininjured children, as had the British Parliament in enacting the Congenital Disabilities Act.
The Court concluded that such a legislative solution would meet both separation of powers
concerns and permit a more careful consideration of the public policy issues. 163

c. Abortion Law
Canada’s abortion jurisprudence is consistent with the approach taken by the
Supreme Court in Dobson and Winnipeg Child and Family Services. In its landmark 1988
decision in Regina v. Morgenthaler, 164 the Court invalidated Canada’s criminal abortion law 165
without focusing on foetal personhood. The Morgentaler court found that the abortion law’s
provisions, which placed the decision about whether a woman could have an abortion solely
within the hands of a three member physician committee, violated women’s right to
“security of the person” under Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 166
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Under the law, many women faced considerable delay in obtaining an abortion, as many
needed to seek permission for abortion at multiple hospitals because of uncertainty about
whether permission would be granted. In addition to the psychological stress caused by
uncertainty and delay, many women were also burdened by the fact that the medical
procedure they sought was regulated under the criminal law. The Court concluded that by
removing women entirely from the decision-making process, this system deprived them of
the “security of the person” protected by Section Seven of the Charter. Concurring Justice
Deetz stated the Court’s reasoning succinctly: “A pregnant woman's person cannot be said
to be secure if, when her life or health is in danger, she is faced with a rule of criminal law
which precludes her from obtaining effective and timely medical treatment.” 167 Concurring
Justice Wilson was the strongest in her critique of the abortion law, 168 although she
nonetheless recognized the state interest in protecting the potential human life that a foetus
represented. Justice Wilson reasoned that the governmental interest in protecting that life
must vary with the stage of foetal development, suggesting in dicta that the governmental
interest did not become compelling until somewhere in the second trimester. 169
A year later, in Daigle v. Tremblay, 170 the Court directly addressed the question of the
legal status of the foetus. In this case, a pregnant woman’s physically abusive male partner
sought an injunction to prevent her from having an abortion. After a lengthy litigation
process, played out in the Canadian press, the Supreme Court ruled that the man had no
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right to prevent the abortion because, under Canadian and Quebecois law, a foetus was not a
“juridical person,” with rights and legal protections while in utero. 171
Yet despite the decisions of the Supreme Court in Morgentaler that performing an
abortion may not be made criminal, access to abortion can still be difficult in Canada, due to
strong opposition to abortion in some provinces and the poverty and geographic isolation of
many women. 172 Although the Health Canada Act requires that all medically necessary
services be covered under provincial insurance plans, in fact provinces vary widely in the
extent to which they fund abortions, often distinguishing between hospitals, which are fully
funded, and clinics, where funding may be partial. 173 British Columbia and Ontario, for
example, fund abortions fully under provincial health insurance plans, while other provincial
health plans do not fully cover abortions performed at clinics, which may be more likely to
be found in rural areas. 174 Even in provinces which fully fund abortion services, there are
few hospitals and clinics which perform abortions, leading to waiting times. 175

Prince

Edward Island has no hospital or clinic where abortions are preformed, so that its women
must leave the province to seek care, leading to waiting times of up to a month. 176 For
young and poor women, as well as those in rural areas, this can be a significant obstacle to
obtaining an abortion. 177
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d. Assisted Reproductive Technology
Canada has acted to address concerns about the birth of healthy children through its
regulation of assisted reproductive technology (A.R.T.). In 2004, with the passage of the
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, Canada created a uniform approach to the use of this
technology, establishing a federal agency to oversee its use. 178 This agency, Assisted Human
Reproduction Agency Canada, is charged with promoting the health and well-being of both
children born through A.R.T. and the women who use its technologies, whom the Act states
are “more than men directly and significantly affected by …[ A.R.T.].”

179

In order to

accomplish this goal, the agency is mandated to inspect and license facilities performing
A.R.T., as well as to gather and publish data regarding the success of various A.R.T.
procedures. Both of these functions are designed to promote informed consent, which the
Act deems a “fundamental condition of the use of human reproductive technologies.” 180
The Act also prohibits the commercialization of any aspect of A.R.T. 181 Thus, in contrast to
the state-by-state regulatory approach of the United States, the Act establishes a uniform
national regulatory scheme for the use of A.R.T., eliminating differences among provinces in
the laws governing its use. Unlike France, this law does not mandate any government
support for couples seeking to use A.R.T.

2. Health Care Access
Of course, the fact that Canadian courts do not recognize foetuses as juridical
persons tells us nothing about whether pregnant women receive adequate health care under
the Canadian health care system. Although Medicare, as the Canadian health system is
178

Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2004, c.2, assented to Mar. 29, 2004.
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known, provides universal coverage, in reality access to appropriate health care and to other
prerequisites for health is not equal across class and racial lines. In addition to the problems
with abortion access noted above, there are many people who do not receive appropriate
health care under the Medicare system. Aboriginal peoples in particular lack adequate health
care, housing, and nutrition, and their health status reflects these deficits. 182
At present, there are inadequate treatment resources for alcohol and other drug
addictions across Canada. 183 Women who acknowledge their addiction and seek treatment
face “devastating barriers to treatment.” 184

Women are inhibited in their reporting of

substance abuse because of the stigma and negative stereotypes about their behavior and
because they fear losing custody of their children. 185 As in the United States, poor women
and women of color are significantly more likely to be screened for substance abuse than
middle class women. 186 Further, treatment programs are not designed to reflect the special
factors that predispose women to substance abuse compared to men, or to offer more
supportive, less judgmental interventions to protect women and their fetuses. 187

Both

epidemiological studies and a review of the cases in which judicial intervention to protect the
foetus has been sought suggest a strong connection between domestic violence and the use
of alcohol and other drugs by pregnant women. 188 Nonetheless, Canada is attempting to
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address its growing substance abuse problem. In 2007 it announced a national campaign to
prevent and treat substance abuse among Canadians aged fifteen and twenty-four, who
constitute 60% of illicit drug users, focusing on prevention rather than incarceration as its
primary tool. 189

3. Social and Economic Support for Children and their Families
Canada provides pregnant women and new parents with several economic supports
that permit them to be at home with a new child for a maximum of sixty-five weeks. 190
Qualifying individuals can receive up to fifteen weeks of sickness benefits, fifteen weeks of
maternity benefits, and thirty-five weeks of parental benefits. 191 These benefits reimburse
55% of a worker’s earnings up to a maximum of $22,620 per year, thus providing a greater
relative benefit to low- and middle-income workers. 192 Parents who return to work while
still receiving maternity or sickness benefits will have their benefits reduced “dollar for
dollar” by the amount they earn, but parents may retain a portion of parental benefits even if
they return to work. 193
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B. France
1. The Legal Framework Regarding Fetuses

a. Introduction
The French position on fetal protection might best be described as one of
supporting the potential for new human life represented by pregnancy, but not treating
either embryos or fetuses as fully human, drawing a bright line at birth. Thus, French law
promotes the birth of children through state-regulated and state-funded assisted
reproductive technology, as well as significant economic support to encourage French
citizens to have larger families. France provides universal health care to children and adults
and French law mandates generous maternity leaves and other benefits to defray the costs of
having more children.

It also limits pregnant women’s ability to work in hazardous

conditions. At the same time, French law appears to respect women’s rights to control their
bodies and the health care they receive. This is evidenced by the declaration of the National
Consultative Committee of Ethics 194 that intervention in a pregnant woman’s right to refuse
medical treatment should rarely be overridden, and through the availability of governmentfunded abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.
As in Canada, a unified judicial system and a strong national Parliament establish a
uniform system of laws throughout the country. The highest French court, la Cour de
Cassation, 195 has recognized a civil cause of action against third parties for harm caused prior
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to birth by medical malpractice, 196 but Parliament has effectively overturned this decision, by
limiting the relief available in such cases and providing that the compensation is for the
parents of the injured child for their losses, rather than directed to the child itself. Most
significantly, in homicide cases French law has consistently recognized birth as a bright line.
The Cour de Cassation has held repeatedly that because a fetus is not a person, no homicide
charges may be brought against a party who causes the death of a fetus, whether the
defendant is a doctor or another third party, such as a drunk driver. 197 No French woman
has ever been criminally prosecuted for conduct causing harm or death to her fetus, nor has
any French woman been civilly committed as a means of preventing harm to her fetus, even
though there is rising concern that the alcohol consumption of French women is putting
children at risk. 198

b. Criminal Law
(1.) Homicide Prosecutions
In three cases decided in the last eight years, the Cour de Cassation has held that a
fetus is not a “juridical person,” and thus one who causes the death of a fetus cannot be
prosecuted for homicide. 199 Two cases arose out of medical malpractice, while the other
involved fetal death as a result of a motor vehicle accident.
court of last resort for those cases. See “le Conseil d’Etat en bref” at http://www.conseiletat.fr/ce/missio/index_mi_ce01.shtml.
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The “Vo” case, 200 which attracted the most attention, involved a physician’s mistaken
identification of a patient, which led him to commit malpractice.

Two women of

Vietnamese ancestry, both surnamed Vo, were patients at the same hospital. 201 One patient
was six months pregnant, and the other patient was there to have an IUD removed. The
defendant physician called out to the waiting room for Madame Vo, and the pregnant
patient responded. Without any preliminary physical examination, the physician attempted
to remove the IUD he believed the woman was carrying. Instead, he ruptured the amniotic
sac surrounding the fetus, ultimately causing its demise at the age of twenty to twenty-one
weeks. 202 Apparently because of the difficulties of bringing a medical malpractice case in
France, 203 Madame Vo instead sought a criminal prosecution, and the physician was charged
with unintentional homicide. 204 After a complicated procedural history, the case reached the
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the French Cour D’Assises, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 791, 793 (2001) (hereinafter The Intersection of Two
Systems).
200
French criminal cases are generally not cited by the names of the defendants, but by their decision
numbers and dates.
201
Vo. France, Application no. 53924/00 (European Court of Human Rights 2004), at ¶¶ 10-11, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng.GrandChamber judgmentVovFrance080704.
202
Id. at ¶¶ 11-12, 14.
203
These difficulties include problems in suing physicians, many of whom are state employees, and the
prolonged nature of malpractice litigation. The latter problem is exemplified by the case of Nicholas
Perruche, discussed infra at text accompanying n’s [ - ] , whose case took fourteen years to progress
through French courts.
204

Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. This is the term used to describe the crime of “homicide involontaire,” Criminal Code
Article 319, under which the defendant was prosecuted, in the English version of the European Court of
Human Rights decision in Vo. Article 319 provided that, “Anyone who through his or her inadvertence,
negligent act, inattention, negligent omission or breach of regulation unintentionally commits homicide or
unintentionally causes death, shall be liable to imprisonment of between three months and two years and a
fine of between 1,000 and 30,000 francs.” Through a reorganization of the Penal Code, this crime is now
prosecuted under Article 221-6, which provides that, “Causing the death of another person by clumsiness,
negligence, carelessness, recklessness or breach of an obligation of safety or prudence imposed by statute
or regulations, constitutes manslaughter punished by three years’ imprisonment and a fine of € 45,000.”
The French Penal Code is available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes_traduits/code_penal_text.
For purposes of consistency, I will use the term unintentional homicide throughout this section.
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Cour de Cassation. 205 That court noted the scientific uncertainty surrounding the precise
moment at which a zygote becomes an embryo, an embryo becomes a fetus, and a fetus
becomes viable, and declared that this uncertain and contingent status precluded it from
upholding a homicide conviction in light of the principle that penal laws are to be strictly
construed. 206
The European Court of Human Rights upheld the decision of the Cour de Cassation
against an appeal brought by Madame Vo. She alleged that the failure of French law to
recognize a fetus as a person violated Article II of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which provides that “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.” 207 The
European Court of Human Rights rejected the challenge, holding that because France
provided adequate administrative remedies for the physician’s malpractice, it was
unnecessary to impose a criminal sanction for the unintentional killing. 208 Significantly, the
court found that in view of the diversity of viewpoints among European member states
about the legitimacy of abortion, the question of when life begins, and whether a fetus was a
“person,” it “’it would be inappropriate to impose one exclusive moral code.’” 209

205

The Lyons Criminal Court acquitted the physician doctor on the ground that the fetus was not a person,
and the case was appealed. Vo. v. France at ¶¶ 19-20. The Lyons Court of Appeal reversed the lower court
judgment, holding that the doctor was guilty of unintentional homicide and imposing a heavy fine and a
suspended six month prison sentence. Id. at ¶ 21. The physician then appealed.

206

Id. at ¶ 22, see also Vo case, Cour de Cassation, June 30, 1999, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/Visu?cid=101247&indice=1&table=CASS&ligneDeb=1.

207

Id. at ¶ 46.

208

Id. at ¶¶ 91-95. Notably absent from the opinion of either the Cour de Cassation or the European Court
of Human Rights was any meaningful discussion of the circumstances under which Madame Vo
experienced negligent treatment from a physician, or the racism or language barrier that could have
precipitated this incident. Why, for example, did the treating physician not ask Madame Vo why she was
visiting him, rather than immediately reaching into her uterus ?

209

Id. at ¶¶ 82, 87-95.
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In two opinions rendered after its decision in the Vo case, the Cour de Cassation
reiterated its view that birth was essential to a homicide prosecution. The first, the Potonet
case, also involved medical malpractice.

A midwife and physician were charged with

unintentional homicide based on allegations that they failed to act swiftly enough after a
pregnant woman (Madame Potonet) alerted them to the irregular heartbeat of her fetus
during a difficult labor and the fetus was stillborn. The Cour de Cassation declared explicitly
that no conviction for involuntary manslaughter was possible because a fetus becomes a
human person only after birth. 210
The Cour de Cassation also took this view in a case involving the death of a fetus as
a result of harm to a pregnant woman as the result of a motor vehicle accident. In the
Grosmangin case, in which a driver injured a pregnant woman and caused the death of her six
month old fetus, the Court upheld the driver’s conviction for involuntary harm to the
woman but ruled that he could not be convicted of involuntary manslaughter of the fetus.
The Court held that the principle of “legality of offenses and punishments which requires a
strict interpretation of penal law precludes the extension of the law on unintentional
homicide to the child to be born, whose legal status is enshrined in particular texts dealing
with embryos and fetuses.” 211 The Grosmangin decision was followed in a subsequent lower

210

Cour de Cassation, Chambre Criminelle, 2002-06-25, 00-81359 (Publication: Bulletin criminel 2002 N°
144 p. 531). The court declared, « il ne peut y avoir d'homicide involontaire du foetus, celui-ci ne devenant
une personne humaine qu'après la naissance. »
211
Grosmangin case, Cour de Cassation, Assemblée plénière, 2001-06-29, 99-85973, (publication: Bulletin
2001 A. P. N° 8 p. 19 ; La Semaine juridique, 2001-07-18, n° 29 p. 1432). The Court declared: « le
principe de la légalité des délits et des peines, qui impose une interprétation stricte de la loi pénale, s'oppose
à ce que l'incrimination prévue par l'article 221-6 du Code pénal, réprimant l'homicide involontaire d'autrui,
soit étendue au cas de l'enfant à naître dont le régime juridique relève de textes particuliers sur l'embryon
ou le fœtus. »
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court case involving an automobile accident in which both the pregnant woman and her
fetus were killed. 212

(2.) Prosecutions for Other Fetal Harm
French law makes it a crime to terminate a pregnancy without the woman’s
consent.” 213 It is a lesser crime to terminate pregnancy past the legal time limit for
abortion, 214 or when the one who terminates the pregnancy is not a physician, or when the
procedure is not performed in an approved hospital. 215 In addition, it is a crime to furnish a
pregnant woman “with the physical means to practice a termination of pregnancy on
herself.” 216 Defendants who habitually perform these acts are subject to more severe
sanctions. 217 However, since abortion became legal in 1975, 218 no French woman has ever
been criminally charged for causing harm to her fetus. 219

212

Elias case, C.A. Metz, Chambre des Appels Correctionnels, 17 février 2005 (affaire n° A 04/00700 G.
Kévin, CA n° 05/222).
213
French Penal Code Article 223-10. This article, and the others discussed in this paragraph, are in a
section of the Penal Code separate from the one addressing “Offenses Against Life.”
214
French abortion law is discussed infra, in section c. (4).
215
French Penal Code Article 223-11.
216
French Penal Code Article 223-12.
217
French Penal Code Articles 223-11-12.
218
Abortion was made legal on January 17, 1975, by the Law Veil, Law n°75-17, authorizing abortion at
any time up to ten weeks when the pregnant woman was in a “state of distress.” Critics of the law objected
to its seven day waiting period, and the requirement that women undergo a psychological interview prior to
receiving an abortion. Although the 1975 law had a "sunset provision" of five years, it was renewed with
minor changes in 1979. Law No. 79-1204 of Dec. 31, 1979, J.O., Jan. 1, 1980, p.3, available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/population/abortion/France.abo.htm.
219

Before the Law Neurwith of 1967, which authorized the disclosure of information on contraceptive
means, and the Law Weil of 1975, the repressive Law of 1920 governed. This law forbade any disclosure
of information on contraceptive means and imposed the death penalty on those who performed abortions.
The last person executed for this crime was Marie-Louise Giraud, a laundress from Cherbourg, who was
convicted of having carried out 27 abortions and guillotined in the yard of Roquette Prison in Paris. See
Marcel Viaud, La libre disposition de son corps, Réfractions numéro 7.
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c. Civil Protection of the Embryo and Fetus
(1.) Assisted Reproductive Technology
In contrast to the United States, where assisted reproductive technology (A.R.T.) 220
flourishes in a market-driven setting and is subject to an incomplete “patchwork” of state
and federal regulation, 221 France was an early pioneer in the regulation of A.R.T. Since 1994
France has recognized the potential benefits of A.R.T as well as its risks, and has developed
a comprehensive set of safeguards to promote A.R.T’s ethical and equitable use. France
promotes the use of A.R.T. in infertile couples, by funding up to six cycles of artificial
insemination and four cycles of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer for any
heterosexual couple in which the woman is under age forty-three. 222 Each year, about one in
a hundred French children is born through in vitro fertilization. 223 The French embrace of
ART is consistent with France’s long-standing pronatalist policy, 224 which is also apparent in
the extensive economic supports provided families with young children and the generous
maternity benefits mandated for working women. 225

220

In France, the technology is known as Medically Assisted Procreation or MAP and is defined by article
L. 2141-1 of the Public Health Code (“Code de la Santé Publique”). Act n° 94-654 of July 29, 1994
addressed “the donation and use of human body parts and derivatives, medically assisted procreation and
antenatal diagnosis.”
221
See generally Judith Daar, Reproductive Technologies and the Law 687-693 (2006), and Jennifer L.
Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should t he Law Protect Them From
Harm?, 57 Utah L. Rev. 57 (2004).
222
Articles L152-1 to L152-19 of the Public Health Code (“Code de la Santé Publique”) inserted by the
Law n° 94-654 of July 29, 1994 art. 8 Journal Officiel of July 30, 1994). To obtain government support, the
couple must either be married or have lived together for at least two years. The government reimburses
these ART services fully if they are performed in a public hospital and to a lesser amount if they are
performed in a private hospital or clinic. Thus, there are still economic disparities in who may avail
themselves of ART, but it is not as great as in the United States. It is illegal for same sex couples to practice
ART and French women in same sex couples often go to Belgium, where it is authorized, to practice it.
223
See Bruce Crumley, Maman? Papa? Oncle? A 62-year-old and her brother take home 'their' two
children — her womb, his sperm, another mother, 158 Time Europe (No. 1), July 2, 2001.
224
This policy is said to reflect a variety of concerns, from the need to respond to the extraordinary loss of
young men in World War I, to the aging of the French population (21.8 percent of the population was over
60 in 2001, according to an estimate released by the INSEE (The National Institute for Statistical and
Economic Research), and the low but recently increasing birth rate. See the INSEE website, at
http://www.insee.fr/en/home/home_page.asp
225
See discussion infra in sections - .
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At the same time that government support for A.R.T. was initiated, the Bioethics
Laws of 1994 established rules prohibiting its commercialization. 226 The provisions
concerning A.R.T. declare that egg and sperm donation is to be anonymous, 227 and prohibit
both surrogate birth arrangements 228 and postmortem embryo and sperm transfer. 229

All

donation, transfer, and storage of gametes and embryos must be performed by government
or licensed private not-for-profit organizations, which are subject to extensive regulation. 230
226

The Bioethics Laws of 1994 were actually three separate statutes. The first, providing for “Respect of
the Human Body, amended the Civil Code. These provisions were added by the Act n° 94-653 of 29 July
1994 in two new chapters of the Civil Code: Chapter II - Of Respect Of The Human Body And Chapter IIIOf The Genetic Study Of The Particulars Of A Person And Of The Identification Of A Person Owing To
His Genetic Prints. The second statute, governing organ and tissue donations and ART, amended the
Public Health Code and the Penal Code. Act n° 94-654 of 29 July 1994 added provisions regarding the
“Donation and Use of Human Body Parts and Derivatives, Medically Assisted Reproduction and Antenatal
Diagnosis.” The third statute added provisions to the Public Health Code regarding confidentiality of
medical and research data. Act n° 94-548 of 1 July 1994 added provisions regarding “The Use of
Nominative Data for Research Purposes in the Field of Health and Modifying Law 78-17 of 6 January 1978
on Information, Files and Liberties.” As the French Parliament was considering the proposed Bioethics
Laws of 1994, the President of the National Assembly and sixty-four other deputies challenged the laws’
constitutionality, alleging specifically that the law, which permitted destruction of embryos as part of the
ART process, was unconstitutional because it negated the embryos’ right to life. Under the French
Constitution, which establishes the Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council), the President, Prime
Minister, President of the National Assembly or Senate, or sixty deputies or senators may refer a proposed
law to the Constitutional Council prior to its enactment for an opinion on its constitutionality. This is the
only opportunity for constitutional review; once the law is enacted it may no longer be challenged on
constitutional grounds. French Constitution, Title VII (“le Conseil Constitutionnel”), art. 61 and 62. The
Constitutional Council ruled that the constitutional principle of human dignity applies to embryos, but not
the right to life and the principle of equality, and therefore the selection of embryos for pre-implantation
diagnostic procedures and the destruction of other embryos authorized under the proposed law did not raise
constitutional concerns.226 Décision n° 94-343/344 DC, Loi relative au respect du corps humain et loi
relative au don et à l'utilisation des éléments et produits du corps humain, à l'assistance médicale à la
procréation et au diagnostic prenatal. Journal officiel du 29 juillet 1994, p. 11024, available in French at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/1994/94343dc.htm.
227
Act n° 94-654 of 29 July 1994, Article L.152-5. Article 16-8 of the Civil Code also mandates
anonymity of the egg and sperm donor, as well as anonymity of the donor and recipient of human organs
and tissues. Section 311-19 of the Civil Code also provides that in cases of ART in which a third party is
involved as an egg or sperm donor, no parent-child relationship exists between the donor and child thus
created. Section 10 of the Respect for the Human Body Act inserts in chapter I of title VII of book I of the
Civil Code a part 4 entitled “Medically Assisted Reproduction”, comprising two new sections 311-19 and
311-20. Section 311-19 provides that, in the case of medically assisted reproduction by donor, no
relationship may be established between the donor and the child, and no action for remedies may be
brought against the donor. Section 311-20 sets out the circumstances in which the applicant spouses or
partners must first give their consent before a judge or a notary, who will inform them of the commitments
they enter into thereby in respect of relationship.
228
Act n° 94-653 of 29 July 1994, adding Article 16-7 to the Civil Code, which provides that, “All
agreements relating to procreation or gestation on account of a third party are void.”
229
Act n° 94-653 of 29 July 1994, Article 18.
230
Act n° 94-654 of 29 July 1994, Article L. 673-5.

52

Couples may donate their embryos to other infertile couples, but all frozen embryos must be
destroyed after five years. 231

In 2004, the Bioethics Laws were amended to prohibit human

cloning and to permit stem cell research on embryos donated by their gamete donors until
the cells are six to eight days old. 232

(2). Patients’ Right to Refuse Unwanted Medical Treatment
Pregnant women’s ability to control their bodies and their health care is generally
protected by law and the medical community, although women’s rights are overridden
occasionally. In 2002, an administrative tribunal in Lille affirmed a patient’s right to make
decisions about her health care even though pregnant when it issued an injunction prohibiting
a hospital from performing a blood transfusion on a pregnant Jehovah’s Witness over the
patient’s objection. 233 On the other hand, in 2005 the National Consultative Ethics

231

Article 37 de la loi n° 2004-800 du 6 août 2004 relative à la bioéthique (J.O n° 228 du 30 septembre
2004 page 16802 texte n° 11)
232
Loi n° 2004-800 du 6 août 2004 relative à la bioéthique, J.O n° 182 du 7 août 2004 page 14040 texte n°
1, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnTexteDeJorf?numjo=SANX0100053L. Human
reproductive cloning had been prohibited since 1997, when a decision by the National Ethics Consulting
Committee (Commite Consultatif d’Ethique (CCNE)) determined that cloning violates human dignity, and
therefore was outlawed by Art. 16-4 of the Civil Code. The new law codifies this prohibition, providing a
statutory penalty of up to twenty years in prison for this “crime against the human species.”
Experimentation on embryonic stem cells was placed under the authority of a successor agency to the
CCNE, the “Agence de Biomedicine,” which is to review all proposed embryonic stem cell research to
ensure that the goal of the research be to achieve therapeutic advances, which are not attainable through
alternative methods, and that it meet ethical standards. In addition, the embryos to be used in such
research must be given by the “parents” of the embryo, after they are no longer seeking to create a child.
The new Bioethics Law has been implemented by two decrees issued by the Minister of Health, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheSimpleTexte?fs_jojour=30&fs_jomois=Septembre&fs_j
oannee=2004&fs_natu=decret&fs_num=&fs_nor=&fs_jour=28&fs_mois=Septembre&fs_annee=2004&fs
_pubjour=30&fs_pubmois=Septembre&fs_pubannee=2004&fs_rech=TIT&fs_mot=loi+bioethique&check
Mot=&checkMotTit=checked&checkMotTitTex=.
233

Tribunal Administratif de Lille, réf., 25 août 2002, no 02-3138. In so ruling, the court relied on Article
1111.4 of the Public Health Code, which provides, inter alia,
In the light of information and advice supplied by healthcarers[sic] and in consultation with them,
patients are entitled to take decisions regarding their own health. Doctors must respect wishes
expressed by patients after informing them of the consequences of their decisions. When refusing
to undergo or continue treatment represents a threat to life, physicians must do their utmost to
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Committee for Health and Life Sciences (CCNE in French) issued an opinion stating that
physicians could override a pregnant woman’s refusal of treatment in exceptional situations,
including C-sections and blood transfusions, which occur with some frequency in the case of
women giving birth by C-section. The Opinion noted the difficulty of such cases, in light of
the woman’s religious beliefs, cultural community, and the risk that a woman who had a
C-section in France might find it more difficult to have a subsequent C-section in her home
country, but the CCNE concluded that it was permissible to override the woman’s wishes
because in order to save the life of the child about to be born. 234 The Opinion suggested,
however, that many of these cases could be avoided if physicians anticipated such problems
and discussed them with patients well before an emergency arose.

The opinion urged

physicians to endeavor to work through the issue with the patient in an atmosphere of trust,
relying on second opinions and mediation to ensure a continuing dialogue with the patient. 235
In contrast to its approach to C-sections and blood transfusions, the Opinion declared that
pregnant women who were HIV positive could not be forced to receive treatment to decrease
the risk that their children would also be born with HIV. 236 Importantly, the Opinion
declared that the legal and ethical dilemma posed by patients’ refusal of treatment could not
convince patients to accept essential treatment. No medical act nor [sic] any treatment may be
applied without securing free and informed consent from the person concerned. Consent can be
withdrawn at any time.
Translated in the National Consultative Ethics Committee for Health and Life Sciences (CCNE), Opinion
No, 87, Treatment Refusal and Personal Autonomy, at 16 (hereafter cited as CCNE Opinion 87), or Avis
n°87[2005] CCNE Refus de traitement et autonomie de la personne, French and English translations
available at http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/francais/avis/a_087.htm. The French text reads: « Toute personne
prend, avec le professionnel de santé et compte tenu des informations et des préconisations qu'il lui fournit,
les décisions concernant sa santé. Le médecin doit respecter la volonté de la personne après l'avoir informée
des conséquences de ses choix. Si la volonté de la personne de refuser ou d'interrompre un traitement met
sa vie en danger, le médecin doit tout mettre en oeuvre pour la convaincre d'accepter les soins
indispensables. Aucun acte médical ni aucun traitement ne peut être pratiqué sans le consentement libre et
éclairé de la personne et ce consentement peut être retiré à tout moment. »
234

CCNE Opinion 87 at 6-7.
CCNE Opinion 87 at 27-28.
236
Id. at 11.
235
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be solved by a reflexive application of the French legal obligation to “assist a person in
danger.” 237

(3) Civil Actions for Causing Harm in Utero
French courts and Parliament have recognized limited rights to sue for damages
caused by negligence that affected the fetus in utero. In the landmark Nicolas Perruche case, 238
the Cour de Cassation affirmed the award of damages of €900,000 (about $1.32 million in
current American dollars) to the parents of a child born with severe birth defects due to his
mother’s contracting rubella while pregnant, based on the clear causal connection between
the physician’s negligence and the harm suffered. Madame Perruche had told her physician
that she might have been exposed to rubella, and informed him that she would have an
abortion if there was a risk that she would give birth to a disabled child. However, due to the
physician’s negligence, the mother was not informed of test results which showed that she
had in fact contracted rubella.
Both the Parliament and the National Consultative Ethics Committee for Health and
Life Sciences (the CCNE) responded strongly to the Perruche decision. The CCNE issued an
opinion expressing its concerns about the decision’s legal and ethical consequences. 239 On
March 4, 2002, Parliament also responded, enacting a statute “governing the rights of ill
237

Penal Code Article 63 states that “anybody who is able, without risk to himself or to a third party, to
avoid either a crime or an offense against the bodily integrity of a person and who abstains from doing it
will be punished to the same sentence as for the crime of a person who voluntarily abstains from securing
someone.” In French the Code reads: « Quiconque pouvant empêcher par son action immédiate, sans risque
pour lui ou pour les tiers, soit un fait qualifié de crime, soit un délit contre l'intégrité corporelle de la
personne s'abstient volontairement de le faire. Sera puni des mêmes peines quiconque s'abstient
volontairement de porter à une personne en péril l'assistance que sans risque pour lui ni pour les tiers il
pouvait lui prêter, soit par son action personnelle soit en provocant un secours.»
238
99-13.701, Arrêt du 17 novembre 2000, Cour de cassation - Assemblée plénière.
239
The Minister particularly requested the National Consultative Ethics Committee's opinion on three
points: the place in society of handicapped adults and children; the intrinsic value of a handicapped life as
related to non birth; and good medical practices entailing liability on the part of prenatal diagnosis
practitioners. See Avis n°68 [2001] CCNE available at http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/english/avis/a_068.htm
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people and the public health system.” The law provides that children do not have a right not
to be born, and that a child cannot be awarded damages for wrongful birth due to a failure to
diagnosis a condition for which the mother might have chosen abortion. 240 The law permits
suits by the parents to go forward in cases of extreme physician fault, but the damages which
can be awarded are limited to “moral damages,” of no more than € 7,500-15,000. 241 The law
was given retroactive effect. However, its retroactive application was found to violate Article
34 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. 242

(4). Abortion Law
Abortion has been legal in France since 1975, and access to abortion was expanded
in 2001. Currently, French women can obtain an abortion during the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy if they are in “a state of distress,” and wait at least seven days after their first
request for an abortion. 243 Abortions may also be performed in the second trimester if two
physicians and a psychologist or social worker certify that the continued pregnancy poses a
risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman or there is a risk of fetal malformation or
240

Article 1 of the Law n° 2002-303 of 4 mars 2002 « relative aux droits des malades et à la qualité du
système de santé ». In French the Law reads: « Nul ne peut se prévaloir d'un préjudice du seul fait de sa
naissance. La personne née avec un handicap dû à une faute médicale peut obtenir la réparation de son
préjudice lorsque l'acte fautif a provoqué directement le handicap ou l'a aggravé, ou n'a pas permis de
prendre les mesures susceptibles de l'atténuer. Lorsque la responsabilité d'un professionnel ou d'un
établissement de santé est engagée vis-à-vis des parents d'un enfant né avec un handicap non décelé
pendant la grossesse à la suite d'une faute caractérisée, les parents peuvent demander une indemnité au titre
de leur seul préjudice. Ce préjudice ne saurait inclure les charges particulières découlant, tout au long de la
vie de l'enfant, de ce handicap. La compensation de ce dernier relève de la solidarité nationale ».
241
Article 1 of the Law n° 2002-303 of 4 mars 2002 and the decision of the Cour administrative d'appel
(CAA) de Paris, troisième Chambre, 13 juin 2002, Assistance Publique Hôpitaux de Paris contre Époux M,
JCP E Semaine Juridique (édition entreprise), n° 15, 10/04/2003, pp. 33-34
242
Maurice v. France, Judgment of European Court of Human Rights, June 21, 2006, available at
After this
http://cmiskp.echt.coe.int/tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?sessionId=1551928&skin=hudoc-en&acti....
judgment was rendered, the parties reached a negotiated settlement on the amount of damages. See also
“La justice suspend sa décision dans une demande de réparation pour un enfant né handicapé, » (Paris) Le
Monde,
May
21,
2005,
at
http://www.chirurgiens-defrance.org/DOSSIER_DOCCHIR/DOC_05_05_21_MONDE_APPEL.htm .
243

The 2001 amendments to the law eliminated the requirement of a psychological interview. « loi relative
à l'interruption volontaire de grossesse et à la contraception, » Article 11 of Law No 588, July 4, 2001.
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genetic defect. 244 Minors are authorized to receive an abortion without parental consent if
they are accompanied by another adult, 245 and indeed, on “free Wednesdays,” when French
schools are closed in the afternoon, clinics are open to teenagers to provide them with
reproductive advice and services. The national health system includes abortion as a covered
procedure, with women paying about 20% of the cost, although minors and poor women
receive free abortions. 246 In practice, women must often wait three to four weeks to have an
abortion, and two-thirds of abortions are performed at public hospitals because of the dearth
of private physicians who perform the procedure.

3. The Health Care System and Efforts to Improve Children’s Health

(a) Efforts to Reduce Harm to Children Because of Alcohol Exposure in Utero
In the last several years, both government and private actors have attempted to
reduce the incidence of fetal alcohol syndrome and other harmful effects of exposure to
alcohol in utero. 247 The problem appears particularly pronounced in poor industrial areas,
including Robaix and Lille in northern France. In 2004, the public prosecutor in Lille
launched a criminal investigation against wine producers and the French government into the
244

Id. An abortion may be performed at “any time if two doctors of a multidisciplinary team testify that the
continuance of the pregnancy will put the woman’s health in danger or that there is a strong probability that
the child to be born is affected by a particularly serious disease known to be incurable,” The French text
reads: « L'interruption volontaire d'une grossesse peut, à toute époque, être pratiquée si deux médecins
membres d'une équipe pluridisciplinaire attestent, après que cette équipe a rendu son avis consultatif, soit
que la poursuite de la grossesse met en péril grave la santé de la femme, soit qu'il existe une forte
probabilité que l'enfant à naître soit atteint d'une affection d'une particulière gravité reconnue comme
incurable au moment du diagnostic ».
245
Article 11 of Law No 588, July 4, 2001. However, some physicians refuse to perform abortions for
minors without their parents’ consent. Danielle Hassoun, Medical Abortion in France, in Medical
Abortion : Meeting Women’s Needs (Hobden, J., ed. 2001).
246
Currently a surgical abortion costs between € 137 and € 213, and a medical abortion costs about € 200.
The conditions of reimbursement were set by a decree on February 20, 1990 (arrêté du 20 février 1990)
with the same conditions as surgical abortions. See IUSSP International Population Conference Tours,
France,
18-23
July
2005,
available
in
French
at
http://iussp2005.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=52321.
247
It has been estimated that .3 % of all French newborns, or 2,100 children annually, show symptoms of
fetal alcohol syndrome. CAMSP, a French medical watchdog group. get better cite.
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damage caused by in utero alcohol exposure, with potential charges of putting another’s life in
danger, aggravated deception regarding merchandise (i.e., wine), and causing involuntary
injuries. 248 Perhaps in response, in 2005 the Parliament enacted a law that requires all wine
sold in France to carry a warning against drinking by pregnant women. 249 The law requires all
wine bottles to carry a logo using the ubiquitous red circle with a line through it encircling a
pregnant woman. 250

(b) The French Health Care System in General
France has a universal health care system, in which all legal residents are entitled to
receive treatment. People are expected to pay for the care when it is given, and then are
reimbursed for it, with different percentages of reimbursement depending on the type of
care given (e.g., emergency room treatment, out-patient office visits, and prescription
medications). 251 The system is generally considered to deliver high quality care, although its
high costs have lead to calls for modification. 252

In 2004, the government tightened

eligibility criteria for accessing the national health care system, excluding immigrants who
have recently arrived in France. 253
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3. Social and Economic Support for Children and Their Families
France has adopted an extensive economic and social support system to encourage
parents to have large families. Women are granted sixteen weeks of maternity leave for their
first child, and twenty-six weeks for their second and subsequent children. 254 Men are
granted eleven days of paid paternity leave. 255 Mothers are entitled to take additional unpaid
leave, and women whose children are very ill or disabled children are able to take additional
leave. 256 Women and families with two or more children also receive a variety of economic
subsidies, including the Parental Education and Upbringing Allowance for families with any
child under age three, 257 and subsidized day care for children under age six. 258 Single parents
received additional support, 259 and parents of school-age children also receive a once a year
subsidy to help defray the costs of school books and clothing. 260 Other supplements are
available for larger families, and some families are eligible for housing supports. 261 In 2004
this system was modified, to consolidate and eliminate certain benefits, to be replaced with a
single, virtually universal allowance, called the PAJE. 262

IV. Speculation on the Reasons for Different Treatment of the Fetus in American,
Canadian, and French Law
My research suggests four major differences in the legal regimens of the United
States, Canada, and France, which might explain their disparate approaches to “fetal
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protection.” First and foremost is the fact that Canada and France both have strong
national governments, with relatively little power held at the provincial, and departmental,
level, respectively. The second major difference is that in the United States, in contrast to
Canada and France, the right to abortion was established through litigation rather than
legislation. The third significant difference is that in Canada and France, abortion and other
reproductive health care are covered services under the national health care system. The
fourth fundamental difference is that American prosecutors at the state level are elected and
locally accountable, in contrast to both Canada and France, where prosecutors are appointed
and function within a national criminal justice system.

The Strength of the National Government
The strength of the national government in Canada and France has led to the
development of uniform laws regarding criminal law, health care (including abortion,
biotechnology, and other aspects of medical practice), and tort law, to name several areas of
the law, established through national legislative and judicial branches. This stands in marked
contrast to the United States, in which the federal and state governments are separate
sovereign governments, with significant independent authority. Because the United States
government is conceptually a government of limited powers, granted to the federal
government by the states via the Constitution, federal courts and the Congress are reluctant
to intrude on state legislative, judicial, and executive actions, for reasons that are both
practical and “temperamental.” Indeed, the pluralism of the American federal system is
often cited as a plus, with states serving as a laboratory for experimentation. 263
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The Source of Abortion Rights
Of course, as we know, the United States Constitution does impose some important
constraints on state actions. But as is demonstrated by the battle over abortion that has
raged for thirty-five years since Roe v. Wade, 264 in a legal system in which access to a medical
procedure is determined not only by fifty state legislatures and Congress, but also by a
complex hierarchy of state and federal court judges, there are significant opportunities, not
to say temptations, for those who oppose abortion to continue to seek to limit its
availability. 265 The fact that in the United States a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion was
established through constitutional litigation, decided by nine justices of the Supreme Court,
has always made the right more fragile here than in other developed nations, where access to
abortion was hammered out in a national legislative setting, through the process of political
horse-trading which makes compromise seem both possible and reasonable. 266
That the constitutional right to abortion is thus seen as fragile and tentative, capable
of being overturned by the appointment of a different person to a federal appeals court or
the Supreme Court, 267 in turn means that abortion opponents will seek multiple avenues to
undercut women’s ability to control their reproductive lives. These include not only direct
attempts to limit abortion access, but also more indirect efforts to challenge the analytical
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framework governing abortion. Thus, statutes and regulations which recast the fetus as a
child, 268 interfere with women’s abilities to plan in advance for their health care in the event
that they become incompetent 269 or insist that women be told about possible fetal pain and
the stages of fetal development, 270 as well as the criminal prosecution of pregnant women
addicted to alcohol and other drugs must all be seen as a means to undermine abortion, by
making “unborn” life the full equivalent of, if not superior to, the mother’s life.

Universal Health Care – or Not
The failure of the United States to establish universal, government-funded health
care 271 has significant consequences for the debate over abortion and “fetal rights.” This
lack of a national health care system, which would cover abortion and birth control as part
of routine health care, contributes to a situation in which abortion is not regarded by its
opponents as a medical procedure, which can be chosen or rejected by a patient as part of a
personal decisionmaking process, but as murder.

The situation in the United States

contrasts markedly with that of France, where abortion is a fully covered procedure,
available to all women during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, and under certain
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circumstances during later stages of pregnancy. 272 The United States lack of universal health
care also contrasts with the Canadian approach, in which no criminal legislation prohibits
abortion and abortion is a covered medical service under Medicare, the national health care
plan. However, as noted, in practice access to physicians who provide abortion services may
be difficult in Canada, depending on a woman’s income and where she lives.

Different Prosecutorial Systems
Finally, the local and politicized system through which American prosecutors are
chosen differs sharply different from the more national and professional prosecutorial
systems of Canada and France, and contributes to the emotional pitch of the “fetal
protection” wars. The distinct prosecutorial systems of each nation are a product of both
different histories and different philosophies of government.
The local, politically accountable American prosecutor was an early innovation in the
original thirteen colonies. In Great Britain, a system of private prosecution developed in the
Middle Ages and continued through the late nineteenth century, although Crown
prosecutors were appointed by the central government (the King) in important cases. 273 In
contrast, in the American colonies prosecutors were appointed by local colonial
authorities. 274

This made sense, as the colonies were isolated and struggling small

settlements, which were often located at great distances not only from Great Britain but
from other outposts of British rule, and living on the edge of survival. 275 The colonies’
cultural norms varied tremendously based on their founders, with religious orthodoxy
272
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featuring prominently in several of the colonies. 276 Over time, the phenomenon of locally
appointed prosecutors evolved into positive law, with Connecticut leading the way in 1704
by establishing a system of county prosecutors throughout the colony. 277

After the

American Revolution, the states continued the system of local prosecutors, who acted largely
independently within their finite geographic realms. 278 Although laws were enacted at the
state (and federal) level, as the nation moved westward and new communities were
established along the frontier, these communities’ geographic (and sometimes cultural)
isolation meant that local prosecutors were seen as best suited to enforce the criminal law. 279
In the wake of the Jacksonian democracy movement which swept across the United States
beginning in the 1820s, prosecutors became elected, rather than appointed officials. 280 This
practice continues to the present, with forty-five of the fifty states electing prosecutors on
the local level. 281
In contrast, the Canadian system of prosecution continued to follow the British
model even after Canada gained independence from Great Britain in 1867. Consistently with
the development of a national uniform Criminal Code, 282 prosecutors at both the provincial
and federal level initiate criminal proceedings for violations of that Code, although there is a
division of authority depending on the crime’s subject matter. Generally speaking, provincial
Attorneys General and their deputies initiate criminal proceedings at the provincial level for
violations of federal offenses which are not in the Criminal Code (such as environmental and
other regulatory crimes) as well as most provisions of the Criminal Code.
276
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prosecutions of some provisions of the Criminal Code are reserved for the federal
government, including tax offenses, elections offenses, drug crimes, money laundering,
organized crime, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 283

Federal prosecutors are

located in regional and national offenses, and their work is sometimes supplemented by
private counsel who are selected to prosecute cases on behalf of the Crown, 284 perhaps a
throwback to the British system of private prosecution.
In France, prosecutors are actually judicial officials.

The procurer and the juge

d’instruction 285 both prosecute crimes and supervise their investigation, with the latter
becoming involved in more serious cases. With a relatively small number of judicial officials
available to act in this role, the police play a more significant role in the investigatory stages
of the prosecution than in common law countries. 286 As is typical of civil law countries,
prosecutions may also be initiated by a private party, who can also participate in the criminal
process before and during trial. 287
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V.

Recommendations for Change in American Law
Comparative law analysis can inform our understanding of American law, but a

solution to an American social and legal problem must also reflect the unique reality of
American institutions and sensibilities. In the context of the “fetal protection” wars this
reality includes an expensive, dysfunctional, and often inequitable health care system, a
highly decentralized criminal justice system of criminal prosecution, with more than three
thousand separate federal and state prosecutors’ offices, and a society whose cultural mores
vary significantly along the blue to red state continuum, compounded by rapid changes in
the population’s racial and ethnic make-up.
To put an end to the “fetal protection” wars, and to achieve the goal of getting more
women necessary health care access, including drug treatment, so that their children can
have the best chances for a life of health and success, the following four steps are both
crucial and feasible: 1) declaring a national moratorium on prosecutions of women for fetal
abuse, 2) expanding access to health care for women, especially pregnant women, and 3)
improving and expanding substance abuse treatment programs, and 4) expanding the
economic supports necessary for pregnant women and new parents.

End Criminal Prosecutions
The most important step is to end the criminal prosecutions of pregnant women
based on their behavior and decisions while pregnant. Using the resources and connections
of the National Association of Attorneys General, and the National District Attorneys
Association, as well as advocacy groups like the ACLU Reproductive Rights Project and the
National Advocates for Pregnant Women, and medical and public health authorities, all
federal, state, and local prosecutors should be urged to agree to stop criminally prosecuting
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pregnant women. With the exception of South Carolina, the highest court in every state
presented with a “fetal protection” prosecution has declared it unlawful.

The only

conceivable point in initiating bringing such a criminal proceeding is for a prosecutor to
pursue political ambitions and/or to push the state legislature to action. 288 Yet the data are
clear that such prosecutions do not deter pregnant women from abusing substances, either
illegal or legal, because the nature of addiction is such that a drug user cannot readily stop
her drug use. There is no data showing that the use of criminal sanctions in addition to the
ones already available for the underlying crime of drug use or possession have any salutary
effect on the addict’s behavior or a general deterrence effect.

Instead, all available data

suggest that such sanctions simply make women more fearful of revealing the problem of
their addiction, and therefore less likely to receive the help they need.

Reform the American Health Care System
The health care system must be reformed to guarantee health care across their lives
to all Americans, with pregnant women and women of child-bearing age given priority in
this reform effort. Medicaid already pays for one-third of all American births. How much
better it would be to spend government money preventatively. Young girls, teenagers, and
women of reproductive age are much less likely to become pregnant in situations where this
is not advisable or desired if they (and their male counterparts) have routine access to ageappropriate health care. This must include reproductive health care to prevent infertility, the
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases, and other reproductive health problems, as
well as pregnancy, through the provision of birth control and abortion where necessary.
Women who are in good general health and who are able to control their reproductive lives
288
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are much less likely to become pregnant unintentionally or to continue a pregnancy when
other aspects of their lives, ranging from being in school to being addicted to drugs, make
having a baby unwise.

Provide Effective, Non-Stigmatizing Drug Treatment
A major part of this health care reform must include the creation of radically
improved drug treatment programs. Current resources for the treatment of women who
abuse alcohol and other drugs are completely inadequate, for three reasons. Most substance
abuse programs fail to recognize the significant relationship between domestic violence and
women’s mental illness and substance abuse, 289 fail to acknowledge the differing treatment
needs of men and women, and do not provide a supplementary support system which is
necessary for pregnant women to beat their addiction. Only 14% of the drug treatment
facilities in the United States have program specifically designed to treat pregnant and
postpartum women. 290
Many women who abuse drugs were sexually abused or beaten as children, and have
significant mental health and self-esteem issues, which make it much more likely that they
will misuse drugs. 291 Women will not receive the support necessary to recover from
addiction and mental illness unless drug treatment programs and those who work with the
victims of domestic violence acknowledge the causal connections between domestic violence
and substance abuse and mental illness, and actively intervene to prevent a continuation of
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current domestic violence. 292 Those who encounter domestic violence victims, including
police, hospital staff, and social workers, need to be trained about the broader context of
domestic violence, in order for their interventions to be appropriate and effective. 293
Many drug treatment programs are not designed with the needs of women in mind,
nor have they kept abreast of the latest in addiction research. For example, traditional
confrontational approaches, effective with male drug addicts, do not work well with women,
and women also have better treatment outcomes in programs that are for women only. 294
For women who are long-term abusers, residential programs are most effective, 295 but these
programs must take into account the needs of women with children. 296 Child care, housing,
health care, job training, and other supports are all vital if women are to stay clean and
become self-sufficient. 297 In addition, new research suggests that new medications which
focus on the biochemical basis of addiction may assist people in treatment who cannot
afford, in the short term, to be in a residential program. 298 Finally, more programs must
emphasize prevention, to treat addicted women before they become pregnant. 299

Provide Paid Maternity and Parenting Leaves and Other Social Supports
If the United States truly wants to ensure that children are born healthy and are able
to get a good start in life, state and federal governments should end their hands-off approach
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to maternity and parenting leaves. 300 The government, not private employers, should
shoulder the burden of providing economic support to pregnant women and their partners
that will permit them to take a leave from work to prepare for the birth of a child and to
make it possible for them to choose to stay at home with a child for some time after the
child is born, to support that child’s growth and development. The generous benefits
available in France, and the moderate benefits offered in Canada provide some examples to
consider. In addition, social support programs should be expanded to provide additional
support for children who are at high risk for poor health care outcomes or domestic abuse
or neglect, including abuse connected with their mothers’ drug addiction. The include
programs like the Nurse-Family Partnership, which has been shown in trials around the
country to be successful in enhancing children’s health status, improving family planning,
increasing rates of maternal employment, and decreasing families’ reliance on welfare
programs, and generally have the biggest “bang for the buck.” 301

New York City has

recently initiated a program to connect visiting nurses with newly pregnant women who live
in neighborhoods with high infant mortality rates.

The nurses will visit the women

throughout pregnancy and for two years after their infants’ birth, to assist with breastfeeding,
evaluate the infants’ health and the safety of the home environment, provide advice about
child development, and make referrals for other necessary social and health services. 302
While realistically, in a difficult economic climate and an unabashedly capitalist society, these
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reforms may need to be phased in an incremental fashion, it is time that we acknowledged
the need for societal support of all our nation’s children.

CONCLUSION
It is time to move beyond the rhetoric of “fetal protection,” and to work in practical,
non-spectacular ways to help woman escape from addiction, domestic violence, and despair.
Only then can the United States truly take its place among developed nations in promoting
the birth of healthy children.
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